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ESTABLISHING BONDS BETWEEN CHURCH
AND STATE: THE ISSUANCE OF TAXEXEMPT BONDS FOR RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS
MARTHA RATNOFF FLEISHER*

Tax-exempt revenue bonds can raise Establishment Clause
issues when they are used to assist sectarianinstitutions. Recent cases
indicate that their use to finance houses of worship and other
religious projects presents less of a constitutional concern than
previous Supreme Court precedent may have suggested. Because
tax-exempt bond issues require specific approval by the government,
they can convey the message of government endorsement or support
of the sectarian institutions they benefit. For that reason, bond
programs should be crafted to avoid Establishment Clause questions
in this unique area of public-privatesector relations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will consider whether the Establishment Clause

1. The First Amendment provides, in part, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion" (the "Establishment Clause") or
"prohibiting the free exercise thereof" (the "Free Exercise Clause"). U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are
among the provisions that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution makes applicable to the states and their political subdivisions. See
Everson v. 3d. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296,303 (1940).
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prohibits the issuance of tax-exempt bonds by a local government
for the purpose of financing construction of religious facilities for
churches, synagogues, temples, mosques, or other pervasively
sectarian institutions. Historically, courts have rested validation of
tax-exempt bonds for religious institutions on Hunt v. McNair, a
United States Supreme Court case upholding the issuance of taxexempt bonds for a sectarian college.3 In Hunt the Court based its
decision on the grounds that the benefited institution was not
pervasively sectarian and that the bond financing statute fulfilled a
4
secular educational purpose.
A recent Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals decision, Steele v. Industrial Development Board,5 upset
this traditional view of tax-exempt financing for religious
institutions by upholding a governmental authority's issuance of
tax-exempt
bonds for the benefit of a pervasively sectarian
• .
6
university.
As a result of the court's reasoning in Steele, it is likely that
a religious institution will request that a local government issue taxexempt bonds to finance construction of a sanctuary or other
religious building or improvement. The validity of the bond issue
will be tested in the courts.! This article addresses the issues a court

2. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
3. See generally Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 2001 FED App. 0015P (6th
Cir.), 241 F.3d 501, 510 (upholding the constitutionality of tax-exempt bonds
issued to finance the construction of school buildings for a sectarian school).
4. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743-44.
5. 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d 401, cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1188 (2003).
6. "A pervasively sectarian institution is one whose religious functions
cannot be separated from its non-religious functions." Johnson, 241 F.3d at
510. The district court in Steele v. IndustrialDevelopment Board, 117 F. Supp.
2d 693, 706 (M.D. Tenn. 2000), rev'd, 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301
F.3d 401, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003), held that a government
instrumentality's issuance of tax exempt conduit revenue bonds for the benefit
of a pervasively sectarian university violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at
734. The Sixth Circuit did not reject the district court's finding that the
university was pervasively sectarian. See Steele, 301 F.3d at 407-09.
7. See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 1205.021 (Vernon 2003)
(authorizing the issuer of public securities to bring an action to obtain a
declaratory judgment as to the legality and validity of the public securities);
State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 197 N.E.2d 328, 329 (Ohio 1964) (resolving a quo
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will confront in considering validation of such bonds, including
establishing a public purpose for the issue and avoiding
Establishment Clause constraints. This article will assert that the
Supreme Court Justices' recent analyses of Establishment Clause
issues8 indicate that, because of the nature of the government aid in
a tax-exempt financing, the Supreme Court would uphold the
validity of such bonds, if the Justices overcame concerns about the
appearance of government support for favored religious
institutions.
This article will discuss whether this apparent
government approval is superficial, having no legal consequence, or
whether tax-exempt financing of religious facilities for pervasively
sectarian
institutions
remains
impermissible
under
the
Establishment Clause. It will suggest principles that may trouble
the Justices in considering the issues and discuss difficulties that
could result from the Court's adoption of the Steele court's analysis.
The article will conclude with cautions to courts and public officials
about embracing Steele's logic and will suggest ways to overcome
the objections.
Tax-exempt conduit revenue bonds are obligations issued
by governments and government instrumentalities in order to make
loans to private entities to fulfill public purposes. State legislatures
have enacted statutes authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds to
finance improvements for hospitals, universities, primary and
secondary schools, museums, theaters, and other nonprofit entities' °

warranto challenge to the authority of a public body to issue bonds to finance
a project for a private corporation).
8. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-14 (2000); discussion infra Section III(B)(1).
9. The flaws in the current Court's Establishment Clause analysis have
been treated elsewhere and will not be examined here. See, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky, Why the Rehnquist Court is Wrong About the Establishment

Clause, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 221, 222 (2001) (criticizing the increasingly
"accommodationist" approach of four of the current Justices toward the
Establishment Clause).
10. JUDY WESALO TEMEL, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS

59-60 (5th ed. 2001). Other statutes authorize the issuance of tax-exempt
bonds to finance manufacturing facilities, pollution control facilities, and
industrial projects for private or government entities. TEMEL, supra at 61-62;
see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE §§ 165.01-.20 (2002) (pertaining to the issuance of
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whose projects will benefit the public." Legislatures have designed
these statutes to take advantage of federal laws that exempt interest
on obligations of governments from federal income taxation. 12 The
government acts as a conduit between the private borrowers and
individual and institutional lenders who purchase the bonds.
Interest paid to bond owners is exempt from federal, 3 state, and
local income taxes, provided that the bonds meet federal and state
statutory constraints. To reassure bond owners that a bond issue
fulfills these legal conditions, lawyers known as "bond counsel"
deliver opinions confirming the validity and tax-exempt status of
the bonds.' Among other federal tax law requirements, the bonds
industrial development revenue bonds for industry, commerce, distribution,
and research).
11. For example, Chapter 221 of the Texas Health and Safety Code
pertains to financing of projects for hospitals, nursing homes, and other health
care agencies. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 221.001-.104 (Vernon
2003) (governing health facilities development corporations and the issuance
of bonds to finance health care projects).
12. TEMEL, supra note 10, at 206.
13. With certain exceptions, gross income for federal income tax
purposes does not include interest on any obligation of a state, including the
District of Columbia and any possession of the United States, or political
subdivision thereof. 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994). In addition to this statutory
exemption for obligations of states and political subdivisions, revenue rulings
of the Internal Revenue Service allow issuance of tax-exempt bonds by public
corporations or nonprofit corporations acting on behalf of political
subdivisions for specified public purposes, provided certain conditions are
met. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24; Rev. Rul. 57-187, 1957-1 C.B. 65.
14. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-1120(1) (Law. Co-op 1976)
(exempting interest on state and federal bonds from gross income for state
income tax purposes). Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 739 n.3 (1973) cites a
predecessor to this provision.

15. As explained in FUNDAMENTALS

OF MUNICIPAL BONDS:

Essentially every municipal security is accompanied by an
opinion of bond counsel.... That opinion addresses the
main legal issues: that the bonds constitute legal, valid,
and binding obligations of the issuer, and that interest on
the bonds is exempt from federal income taxation under
applicable tax laws. In rendering the opinion, bond
counsel (1)undertakes a review and examination of all
applicable laws authorizing the issuance of securities, (2)
ascertains that all required procedural steps have been
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must be issued by or on behalf of a state or local governmental unit.
The legislative body of the governmental unit issuing the bonds,
such as a city council or the board of directors of a nonprofit
corporation acting on behalf of a local government, authorizes the
issuance of the bonds. In addition, either an elected official of the
jurisdiction in which the project is located, or the voters in that
jurisdiction must approve the bond issue. 1 Because interest on the

completed to assure proper authorization and issuance of
the securities, and (3) determines that all federal tax laws
governing the issuance of the bonds [have been satisfied].
TEMEL, supra note 10, at 10. Comment H to the MODEL BOND OPINION
REPORT of the National Association of Bond Lawyers (NABL), Committee
on Opinions and Documents, dated February 14, 2003, provides:
Bond counsel may render an "unqualified" opinion
regarding the validity and tax exemption of bonds if it is
firmly convinced (also characterized as having "a high
degree of confidence") that, under the law in effect on the
date of the opinion, the highest court of the relevant
jurisdiction, acting reasonably and properly briefed on the
issues, would reach the legal conclusions stated in the
opinion.
NAT'L ASS'N OF BOND LAWYERS, MODEL BOND OPINION REPORT 7 (2003),
http://www.nabl.org/librar-y/comments/MBO/MBopinion.pdf.
available at
Under the Supreme Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
NABL standard cannot be met with respect to the issuance of tax-exempt
bonds to finance religious improvements. For discussions by practicing bond
lawyers of the issuance of bonds for this purpose, see David A. Caprera &
Milton S. Wakschlag, Letters to the Editor, BOND LAW., Mar. 1, 2002 at 50-52;
Griffith F. Pitcher, Steele Reversed, BOND LAW., Sept. 1, 2002, at 42; Griffith
F. Pitcher, Pray to Play Revisited, BOND LAW., June 1, 2002, at 23; Griffith F.
Pitcher, Pray to Play?-Perhapsthe Establishment Clause Does Not Prohibit
the Financing of Places of Worship with Conduit Bonds, BOND LAW., Dec. 1,
2001, at 30; Dean A. Spina, Hail Mary Pass or an End-Around?, BOND LAW.,
Mar. 1, 2002, at 49-50.
Because Congress enacted the
16. 26 U.S.C. § 147(f) (1994).
requirement for applicable elected official or voter approval in The Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, §
2154, 96 Stat. 324, 468 (1982) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 147(f)(2)(B)), the
requirement is referred to as "TEFRA approval." A public hearing must
precede approval by the applicable elected representative. 26 U.S.C.
The public hearing must follow published notice
§ 147(f)(2)(B) (1994).
reasonably designed to inform residents of the governmental issuer and of the
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bonds is tax-exempt, lenders are willing to buy bonds bearing a
lower rate of interest than that borne by bonds bearing interest
subject to taxation. This income tax benefit for the lender reduces
the interest costs the borrower must pay. Bonds are payable solely
from revenues of the benefited institution and are never payable
from taxes levied by the issuing government instrumentality, the
state or any political subdivision of 'the state, or any other public
funds.
These characteristics of tax-exempt conduit revenue bonds
are significant to an analysis of Establishment Clause questions. To
aid the examination, this article will describe one well-recognized
framework the Supreme Court has used to resolve Establishment
Clause issues, as set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman 7 and modified by
Agostini v. Felton."
It will then delineate the traditional
Establishment Clause analysis of tax-exempt financing, beginning
with Hunt v. McNair. 9 It will discuss an alternative explanation for
the holding in Hunt that the Steele court embraced. 0 This article
will then structure and assess an argument to justify the issuance of
tax-exempt bonds for religious institutions applying the LemonAgostini guidelines and using the Steele analysis. The discussion
also will examine two other Establishment Clause tests that
members of the Supreme Court have enunciated, whether a
government practice improperly endorses religion2 ' or improperly
coerces a citizen to support religion.22
A discussion of the current principles of Establishment
Clause analysis of tax-exempt financings under Hunt, Lemon, and
Agostini, and the structure of the argument that Steele suggests, are

governmental unit where a facility is to be located of the proposed issuance. 26
C.F.R. § 5f.103-2(g)(3) (2003).
17. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
18. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
19. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).

20. As discussed below in Section II(B), the Supreme Court identified
this line of reasoning in Hunt but declined to rely upon it.
21. See Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, 705 (M.D. Tenn.
2000), rev'd, 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d 401, cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1188 (2003).
22. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655-56 (2002).
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set forth below.
II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A. The Lemon-Agostini Guidelines
Modern examinations of the Establishment Clause begin
with Justice Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education," in
which he asserted, "In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between church and State.' ,24 Justice Black's
formulation has been modified by judges who focus on the
neutrality of a particular government action, insisting that religious
institutions be treated in the same manner as nonreligious
institutions. To aid the analysis, Supreme Court jurisprudence has
established certain "helpful signposts, 6 for evaluating a statute
under the Establishment Clause. Lemon,27 as modified by Agostini,
23. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). "The applicability of the Establishment Clause to
public funding of benefits to religious schools was settled in Everson, which
inaugurated the modem era of establishment doctrine." Zelman, 536 U.S. at
686-87 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
24. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (citation omitted).
25. For a discussion of this perspective, see infra Section III(B)(1)
(examining Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-14 (2000) (plurality
opinion)). Also, see Justice Souter's summary of the history of the Court's
jurisprudence regarding government aid to religious schools in his dissent in
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688-96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
26. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
27. In Lemon, the Court invalidated statutes under which the state
provided funds to support secular education at nonpublic schools. Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607-11. The Court held that the statutes resulted in
excessive entanglement between church and state because they required
excessive monitoring of religious schools to ensure that money was not spent
on sectarian activities. Id. at 619-22. Members of the Court have expressed
discomfort with the Lemon test and in some cases have not applied the test.
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319-20 (2000) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (identifying cases
that have criticized or ignored Lemon). In spite of these criticisms of the
Lemon-Agostini tests, this article will use the guidelines as a constructive
method for organizing the discussion of tax-exempt financing for religious
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delineates the following tests to establish the constitutionality of a
statute under the Establishment Clause:
(1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose, 2's and
(2) the statute may not have a primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion.29
Government aid has the effect of advancing religion if it:
(a)
results in governmental indoctrination,
defines its recipients by reference to
(b)
3 2 religion," or
entanglement.
excessive
an
creates
(c)
Excessive entanglement involves the consideration of:
(i)
the character and purposes of the institution
benefited,
(ii) the nature of the aid the state provides, and
(iii) the resulting relationship between government and
religious authority.33
The Court initially established these guidelines to "draw
lines with reference to the three main evils against which the
Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection:
'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity.' "34 Applying these standards and
from time to time using other analyses, Supreme Court decisions
have upheld the use of government moneys to support sectarian
institutions in numerous instances.

institutions.

28. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218 (1997).
29. Id. at 222-23.
30. Id. at 219.
31. Id. at 230-31.
32. Id. at 232-33.
33. Id. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)).
34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
35. See generally Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th
Cir.), 301 F.3d 401, 406 n.3, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003) (cataloging cases
in which the Supreme Court found that the government aid programs at issue
were constitutional).
In Zobrest v.Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993), for example,
the Court allowed expenditure of public funds to pay a sign language
interpreter for a deaf child in a religious secondary school. Board of
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B. The Holding in Hunt and the Steele Alternative
The Supreme Court applied the Lemon test in Hunt to
uphold the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for a religiously affiliated
college. After determining that the statute authorizing the issuance
of bonds for institutions of higher education had a secular purpose,
the Supreme Court asked whether the issuance of tax-exempt
bonds under the statute for the benefit of a sectarian college had a
primary effect of advancing religion.] The Supreme Court defined
''primary effect" as follows:
Aid normally may be thought to have a
primary effect of advancing religion when it
flows to an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in the religious mission
or when it funds a specifically religious activity
in an otherwise substantially secular setting. 7
The Supreme Court held that the primary effect of the
assistance afforded to the college was neither to advance nor to
inhibit religion, but rather, to support secular projects. It reached
this determination as a result of its conclusion that the college was
not pervasively sectarian."' The Court also emphasized that the
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), allowed the loan of publicly funded
textbooks to students in religious schools. Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947), held that reimbursing parents for the cost of bus transportation
to religious schools was constitutional.
36. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-45 (1973). In Hunt, the borrowing
was effected by a transfer of the project being financed to the governmental
authority and a lease of the project to the college. Rental payments under the
lease were pledged to the payment of the bonds and matched the debt service
on the bonds. Id. at 738. Other statutes, for example, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN.
§ 221.030(a)(5) (Vernon 2003), authorize a government
instrumentality to lend bond proceeds to private institutions for use in
constructing improvements pursuant to a loan agreement, without conveyance
and leaseback of the project.
37. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743.
38. The record showed that there were no religious qualifications for
faculty membership or student admission and only 60% of the college's
student body was Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to the percentage
of Baptists in that area of South Carolina. The Court equated the college to
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college could not use projects financed with the proceeds of the taxexempt bonds for religious activities.
In a later case describing
Hunt, the Court said that Hunt required "(1) that no state aid at all
go to institutions that are so 'pervasively sectarian' that secular
activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones, and (2) that if
4
secular activities can be separated out, they alone may be funded.", 0
Notwithstanding Roemer's characterization of its holding,
Hunt itself indicated that the Establishment Clause might not
prohibit conduit bond financings for religiously affiliated
institutions even if they were "pervasively sectarian" and might not
prohibit funding of sectarian facilities. In footnote 7 to the opinion
("Footnote 7"), the Court observed, in dictum:
The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very
special sort. We have here no expenditure of
public funds, either by grant or loan, no
reimbursement by a State for expenditures
made by a parochial school or college, and no
extending or committing of a State's credit.
Rather, the only state aid consists, not of
financial assistance directly or indirectly which
would implicate public funds or credit, but the
creation of an instrumentality (the Authority)
through which educational institutions may
borrow funds on the basis of their own credit
and the security of their own property upon
more favorable interest terms than otherwise
would be available. The Supreme Court of
the institutions in Tilion v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), in which the
Court upheld federal construction grants to religiously affiliated colleges and
universities to finance library buildings, a language laboratory, a fine arts
building and a science building. In Hunt, even though members of the board
of trustees were elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, approval
of the Convention was required for certain financial transactions, and the
charter could only be amended by the Convention, the Court concluded that
"there [was] no basis to conclude that the College's operations [were] oriented
significantly towards sectarian rather than secular education." Hunt, 413 U.S.
at 743-44.
39. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 744.
40. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976).
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New Jersey characterized the assistance
rendered an educational institution under an
act generally similar to the South Carolina Act
as merely being a "governmental service." The
South Carolina Supreme Court, in the opinion
below, described the role of the State as that of
a "mere conduit." Because we conclude that
the primary effect of the assistance afforded
here is neither to advance nor to inhibit
religion under Lemon and Tilton, we need not
decide whether, as appellees argue, the
importance of the tax exemption in the South
Carolina scheme brings the present case under
Walz, where this Court upheld a local property
tax exemption which included religious
institutions.4 '
In Footnote 7, the Supreme Court identified the argument
that the issuance of tax-exempt conduit revenue bonds for a
religiously affiliated institution would not offend the Establishment
Clause, because the nature of the aid the government provides is
not an expenditure of public funds. The Court did not preclude
reliance on the rationale discussed in Footnote 7, but based its
decision instead upon its findings that the statute prohibited the
college from using bond proceeds to pay for religious facilities and
that the sectarian college seeking assistance was not pervasively
sectarian.
The Court's reasoning in Hunt influenced judicial and bond
counsel analysis of the constitutionality of tax-exempt financing for
religiously affiliated hospitals and schools for the next three
decades. Bond market participants ignored the Footnote 7 concept
that conferring tax-exemption was not the equivalent of direct
government support. Rather, in reliance on Hunt, state statutes,
financing documents, and opinions rested validation of tax-exempt
bonds for religiously affiliated entities on the ground that the
Loan agreements
institutions were not pervasively sectarian.
prohibited use of bond proceeds to support schools of divinity or
41. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 745 n.7 (citations omitted).
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places of worship, using language conforming to the Court's rules in
Hunt. For example, in Steele, the loan agreement provided:
The Borrower will not use the Project or any
part thereof for sectarian instruction or as a
place of religious worship or in connection with
any part of the program of a school or
department of divinity for any religious
denomination or the training of ministers,
priests, rabbis or other similar persons in the
field of religion.42
The Steele court focused upon this promise in order to
uphold the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for the benefit of a
sectarian university. 3
The Sixth Circuit's approach, however,
radically differed from the Court's analysis in Hunt, because it
relied on the
arguments discussed in Footnote 7 to make its
S 44
determination. Steele upheld the issuance of the bonds, because
the aid was an indirect benefit, analogous to a property tax
exemption or a charitable deduction; no government funds were
expended, and no recourse against the issuer of the bonds or the
government that created the issuer existed in the event of nonpayment. The conduit financing advanced a clear governmental,
secular interest in promoting economic opportunity. The court also
held that the bond program did not present the perception of

42. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d
401, 404 n.1, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003).
43. The Industrial Development Board of Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County issued tax-exempt bonds pursuant to a state
statute authorizing the issuance of bonds in furtherance of the educational
purposes of nonprofit educational institutions, TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-53101(11)(a)(vii) (1990 Supp.), and the Internal Revenue Code's § 141
permitting the issuance of tax-exempt bonds where all property to be provided
by the net proceeds of the bond issue is to be owned by a 501(c)(3)
organization. 26 U.S.C. § 141(e)(1)(G) (1994).
44. Other opinions that have discussed Footnote 7 include Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-14 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting), Johnson v.
Economic Development Corporation, 2001 FED App. 0015P (6th Cir.), 241
F.3d 501, 519 (Nelson, J., concurring); Virginia College Building Authority v.
Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 695-96 (Va. 2000); and Industrial Development
Authority v. Mohler, 51 Va. Cir. 449, 459 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000).
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government endorsement of religion."
In reaching its determination, the court rejected the
taxpayers' objection that, under Hunt, the issuance of the bonds
had the unconstitutional effect of advancing religion by providing a
benefit to a pervasively sectarian institution, a substantial portion of
whose functions were subsumed in its religious mission. The court
explained that "[t]he vitality of the pervasively sectarian test is
questionable in light of subsequent, more recent decisions from the
[United States] Supreme Court," 46 but noted that it was "for the
Supreme Court, not [the Sixth Circuit], to jettison the pervasively
sectarian test., 47 It concluded that "[riegardless of whether the
pervasively sectarian test is still the law, .... given the nature of the
aid in question, the issue
of the bonds [did] not offend the
4
Establishment Clause.,

1

The Steele court explained that the government acted only
as a conduit in a tax-exempt bond issue; that the borrower received
the benefit of a lower interest rate than the interest rate on a
taxable loan; that private lenders, not the government provided
funds to the borrower; and that the only impact on public funds was
the potential loss of tax revenue resulting from the lender's relief
from the obligation of paying taxes on the interest received.4 ' The
court concluded that the issuance of tax-exempt bonds on a neutral
basis was the provision of a generally available governmental
• 50
benefit, akin to the provision of police and fire protection.

45. Steele, 301 F.3d at 416-17.
46. Id. at 408.
47. Id at 409. The court explained that the criticism of the pervasively
sectarian test in the plurality opinion in Mitchell did not control the Sixth
Circuit's decision since, as explained by the district court, "[Tihe holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Id. at 408 (quoting
Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, 706 (M.D. Tenn. 2000)). Thus,
only the holding of Mitchell was binding precedent. Id. Further, the Sixth
Circuit stated, "[T]he lower courts are to treat [the Supreme Court's] prior
cases as controlling until the Supreme Court itself specifically overrules them."
Id. at 408-09 (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 409.
49. ld. at 413.
50. Id at 413-15.
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Steele does not compel the conclusion that tax-exempt
bonds may be issued to finance improvements for a religious
institution since the Sixth Circuit stated that the university did not
use bond proceeds to finance religious facilities.5 Bond counsel
could construct a viable argument, however, based upon extension
of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Steele, that might persuade the
United
••
.States
52 Supreme Court to allow such financings for religious
institutions. To aid the examination, each portion of the LemonAgostini test, with reference to the Steele court's Footnote 7
analysis, is discussed below.
III. APPLICATION OF THE LEMON-A GOSTINI-STEELE
GUIDELINES
A. The Statute Must Have a Secular Purpose
A statute authorizing the issuance of tax-exempt bonds that
would allow financing of religious facilities for a sectarian
institution must have a secular purpose.53 In Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind,4 for example, the Court
upheld tuition grants to a blind student who used federal funds to
attend a religious college for the purpose of becoming a pastor,
missionary, or youth director. The Court identified the secular
purpose of the statute-assisting visually handicapped studentsand explained that no party had suggested that the "actual
purpose" of the statute was to endorse religion or that the
articulated secular purpose was a "sham.' 6 Thus, religious
institutions seeking tax-exempt financing must find statutory
authorization in a law with a secular public purpose.
Finding a suitable statute is no easy task. A law enacted
solely for the purpose of financing improvements for religious
51. Id. at 404, 416.
52. As discussed in note 15, the NABL opinion standard could not be
met without a judicial decision approving the issuance of bonds.
53. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,218-19 (1997).
54. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
55. Id. at 489.
56. Id. at 485-86 (citations omitted).
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institutions would violate the first prong of the Lemon-Agostini
test, since its sole purpose would be to advance religion. Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 7 for example, invalidated a state law that
provided a tax exemption to periodicals that a religious faith
published or distributed since the sole purpose of the exemption
was to advance religion.
Thus, the secular purpose test would require a religious
institution to identify an existing statute with a secular purpose that
issuing bonds for the benefit of the religious institution would
fulfill.
A statute that authorized tax-exempt financing for all
501(c)(3) corporations would be ideal. Typically, however, conduit
statutes have a narrower focus than support for all nonprofit
institutions.
Existing conduit statutes generally have public
purposes such as promoting economic development, education, or
health care. Compounding the difficulty are provisions in existing
conduit laws that prohibit the use of funds for religious facilities.
For example, the definition of an "Education Facility" in
Michigan's Higher Education Facilities Authority Act excludes
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a
place of religious worship, [or] a facility which is used or to be used
primarily in connection with a part of the program of a school or
department of divinity for a religious denomination.
57. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
58. A court might uphold a law broadening the purposes of an existing
statute if the legislative history did not demonstrate that the only purpose of
the new law was to finance religious facilities.
59. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.922 (West 2004). Even in the absence
of a specific prohibition on financing facilities for religious worship,
determining that a religious institution's project was within the scope of an
existing statute would be challenging. An argument that the legislature
intended at the time it enacted the financing statute to include financing of
religious facilities for sectarian institutions would be untenable since no state
legislature could reasonably have believed that such financings were
permissible at the time the statutes were enacted. If Supreme Court
jurisprudence subsequently allowed the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for

religious institutions, however, a local government issuer and a court could
reasonably determine that financing religious facilities would fulfill the public
purpose of a bond financing statute even if such a financing would have been
impermissible when the statute was originally enacted. For example, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), state Medicaid
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To ascertain the scope of the bond financing statute, a court
would examine the words of the statute. ' Bond financing statutes
typically identify the types of improvements that an issuer may
support. For example, Texas statutes define "Educational Facility"
as follows: " 'Educational Facility' means a classroom building,
laboratory, science building, faculty or administrative office
building, or other facility used exclusively for the conduct of the
educational and administrative functions of an institution of higher
education."6
Maryland defines a hospital "project" in this manner:
"[P]roject", in the case of a participating
hospital, means a structure suitable for use as a
hospital, clinic, or other health care facility,
laboratory, training facilities for nursing and
other health programs, laundry, nurses' or
interns' residence, and such other structure or
facilities necessary or useful for the effective
operation of a hospital.62
These Texas and Maryland statutes and similar state laws
are easily adapted to financing nonreligious educational facilities at
sectarian universities and nonreligious health facilities at sectarian
hospitals." In Hunt, for example, the Court held that a state statute
authorizing tax-exempt financing for the benefit of institutions of
higher education had the secular purpose of advancing education,
not the purpose of promoting religion, because its benefits were
available to all institutions of higher education whether or not they

programs would have been permitted to fund abortions, even though such
funding would have been prohibited prior to the decision in Roe. See Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 n.16 (1980). Thus, a court could conclude that
financing facilities for the religious institution would fulfill the public purpose
of the statute because the state legislature intended to authorize any
constitutionally permissible method of fulfilling that goal.
60. See 73 AM. JUR.2D Statutes § 24 (1997).
61. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 53.02(6) (Vernon 2003).
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43C, § 3 (2002).
63. Maryland and Texas bond counsel would need to review the
statutory analysis and, in particular, to confirm that no constitutional or
statutory prohibition against sectarian use of facilities financed exists.
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had a religious affiliation."
Using Hunt's rationale, in State ex rel. Wisconsin Health
Facilities Authority v. Lindner, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for the benefit of a
Catholic hospital and identified improving health care delivery by
lowering health care costs as the "wholesome secular purpose" of
the bond financing statute. 6 Similarly, in Johnson v. Economic
61
Development Corp., the Sixth Circuit upheld the issuance of taxexempt revenue bonds by a public economic development
corporation to finance improvements at a sectarian elementary and
secondary school. s State law authorized the corporation to finance
construction of projects for sectarian and non-sectarian entities for
the secular purpose of alleviating and preventing conditions of
unemployment. 69 Like the courts in Hunt and Lindner, the Johnson
court easily concluded that the bond financing statute had a secular
purpose.
In contrast, it would be challenging to convince a court that
tax-exempt bonds issued to finance a chapel or other religious
project served educational or health care purposes. A broad statute
that authorized tax-exempt financing of any facilities authorized or
permitted by the corporate documents of a university or hospital
would allow a chapel to be financed if the organizational documents
of the institution permitted borrowing for such purpose. Typical
state statutes, however, would require the religious institution to fit
its project within narrow statutory definitions. Under the Texas
statute described above, for example, a university that was not
pervasively sectarian would argue that the campus chapel was an
"educational facility," 0 because it was integral part of the purpose
of the institution-the education of students. So long as the
students were not required to adopt the dogmas of the host church,
opening chapel services to all university students would teach
64. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
65. 280 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. 1979).

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 777-78.
2001 FED App. 0015P (6th Cir.), 241 F.3d 501.
Id. at 516 (determining that the school was not pervasively sectarian).
Id. at 503.

70. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.

§ 53.02(6) (Vernon 2003).
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students about the practices of the church. The state legislature
could also reasonably have intended that financing a chapel would
advance education in the university community where the chapel
would be used for interfaith services or for meetings and
convocations unrelated to religion.
Similarly, to justify on nonreligious grounds the expenditure
of tax-exempt bond proceeds to construct a chapel at a hospital, a
Maryland hospital would demonstrate that the chapel fit within the
statutory definition of a "project." Because of the health benefits
of prayer, the chapel would constitute a facility "necessary or useful
for the effective operation of a hospital."" Evidence that the
patient and family use of the chapel promotes health care would
tend to indicate that the chapel advanced a religious mission only
incidentally. 72 Fitting the funding of a chapel squarely within the
secular statutory definition would therefore demonstrate that the
bond statute itself was religiously neutral and had a valid secular
purpose.
Because financing statutes were written while the prevailing
view was that no financing could occur for a pervasively sectarian
institution, identifying a statute that authorizes financing of
facilities for a religious institution not affiliated with an educational
or health care institution is difficult. Making the financing of
religious facilities for a church, synagogue, temple, or mosque fit
within the declarations of public purpose of bond financing statutes
is less obvious than reaching the conclusion that financing a school
or hospital project, even for a religious institution, advances
educational or health care goals. One possibility is to focus on the
economic development benefits that a religious institution's project
would confer upon a community.
Cases concerning property tax exemptions for religious
institutions have identified the economic importance of religious
institutions. In Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury,7 3 for
example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland examined the public
purpose of exempting church property from property taxation. The

71. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43C, § 3 (2002).
72. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
73. 216 A.2d 897 (Md. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
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court acknowledged the economic benefit to a community of a
house of worship, stating that houses of worship attracted persons
to communities and increased the tax assessment base.74 Using
Murray as a template, a religious institution would argue that local
businesses would benefit from the influx of parishioners who might
patronize their stores. The religious institution would demonstrate
that surrounding property values would increase as a result of the
availability of the religious institution. Statistics supporting these
assertions would counter arguments that financing the construction
of a religious institution decreases public revenues by increasing the
amount of property exempt from property taxes.
Johnson offers an additional basis for arguing that religious
institutions support the economy. As evidence of the promotion of
economic development in Johnson, the court noted that the issuer
had determined that, after the project was completed, the school
would employ five new teachers and two new maintenance
workers. 6 Similarly, a religious institution could demonstrate that
it would employ a sexton, teachers, program directors, service
workers, and members of the clergy.77
In addition to meeting the requirements of an economic
development statute, a religious institution could argue that issuing

74. Id. at 908-09 (citation omitted).
75. Murray acknowledged contrary authority in connection with church
zoning cases which dealt with the apparently negative effect of permits for the
building of houses of worship on immediately adjacent property, but said that
those cases did not apply because "It]he effect of the building of a church
upon the values of adjacent property may be quite different from the
stimulation to house buying and building in the community as a whole." Id. at
909 n.6.
76. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 2001 FED App. 0015P (6th Cir.), 241
F.3d 501, 505.
77. Some states' economic development statutes appear to preclude such
projects. The Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority, for
example, may limit projects to industrial and manufacturing enterprises. KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 154.20 (Michie 2003).
In Tennessee, the economic
development statute appears to allow financings for office buildings but not
for other kinds of buildings for nonprofit institutions. TENN. CODE ANN. § 753-101(11) (1998) (defining "Project"). Other state economic development
statutes must be canvassed and interpreted to determine whether the language
of the statute would encompass religious facilities.
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bonds for its benefit fit the secular state law purpose enunciated in
a statute authorizing the issuance of bonds to promote the general
welfare of the community. In Good News Club v. Milford Central
School," the Court upheld the use of school classrooms after the
end of the school day by a religious group "not for the mere
discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian point of view,
but for an evangelical service of worship calling children to commit
themselves in an act of Christian conversion."'
The majority
opinion equated the services provided by the club to those provided
by the Boy Scouts' and found that the program fit within a statute
that allowed use of school rooms by the public for "instruction in
any branch of education, learning or the arts" or for "social, civic
and recreational meetings and entertainment events, and other uses
pertaining to the welfare of the community."'" Thus, a financing
statute that allowed issuance of tax-exempt bonds for the secular
purpose of promoting instruction in any branch of education,
learning or the arts or for social, civic and recreational meetings and
entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of
the community would allow financing of a sanctuary for a religious
institution that fostered those goals.
Although its ability to fit within current statutes would be
challenging, the religious institution could also argue that it
enhanced health care and social services in the community by
encouraging citizens to support health care programs and by
providing support to the social service programs of religious
institutions. For example, some religious institutions provide AIDS
outreach services.
Some provide emergency food assistance.
Others provide medical services. 2 In Murray, the court relied on

78. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 108.
Id. at 102 (citations omitted).
See, for example, the descriptions of health care and social services

provided by religious institutions at Temple Emanu-El, Social Action, at

http://www.tedallas.org/social-action.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review); Diocese of Dallas, Services and
Facilities, at http://www.cathdal.org/Services.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004)

(on file with the First Amendment Law Review); and Islamic Ass'n of N. Tex.,
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the social activities of religious organizations "such as aid to the
poor and aged, day nurseries, care of the sick and efforts to
eliminate racial inequalities" that "serve public needs [and save] the
State the expense of providing the same services. ' ' Thus, financing
improvements for a religious institution might fit within the plain
meaning of statutes authorizing financing for health care and social
services.
This section has discussed ways in which the issuance of
bonds to finance religious facilities could satisfy state statutory
secular public purpose requirements. Identifying a tax-exempt
bond financing statute with a broad secular purpose that financing
improvements for a religious institution would accomplish, and
which applied neutrally to sectarian and non-sectarian institutions,
would satisfy the first prong of the Lemon-Agostini-Steele test, even
though the statute as applied would benefit a religious institution.
"

B. The Statute May Not Have a PrimaryEffect of Advancing or
Inhibiting Religion
Once a court established the secular purpose of the bond
financing statute, it would then address whether the statute had a
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Supreme Court
cases focus upon whether a statute results in government
indoctrination, creates an excessive entanglement between the
government and a religious institution or defines recipients of
benefits by reference to religion. This section will analyze these
aspects of Establishment Clause principles.
Medical Clinic, at http://www.iant.com/clinic.psp (last visited Mar. 27, 2004)

(on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
83. Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 216 A.2d 897, 907 (Md.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
84. For examinations of these aspects of the Lemon-Agostini test with
respect to financing of secular facilities for pervasively sectarian schools, see
Trent Collier, Revenue Bonds and Religious Education: The Constitutionality
of Conduit Financing Involving Pervasively Sectarian Institutions, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1108 (2002); Stuart J. Lark, 'Pervasively Sectarian' Institutions May Now
Qualify for Tax-Exempt Financing, 12 J. TAX'N EXEMPT ORG. 173, (2001);
Richard D. Winders, Building on the Establishment Clause: Government
Conduit Financing of Construction Projects at Religiously Affiliated Schools in
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(1). The Statute May Not Have a Primary Effect of Advancing or
Inhibiting Religion by Resulting in Governmental Indoctrination
Whether governmental aid to religious institutions results in
governmental indoctrination is ultimately a question of whether the
indoctrination that occurs at religious institutions is attributable to
the government. In its determination of the issue of government
indoctrination in Mitchell v. Helms, a plurality of the Supreme
Court identified the primary factor as whether the government
provides aid neutrally, without regard to religion.'
In defining
"neutrality," the plurality focused on whether the government
distributed government aid directly to religious institutions or
whether individuals making private choices resulted in the delivery
of government aid to religious institutions.8 ' A discussion of these
aspects of governmental indoctrination follows, including
consideration of whether a court could characterize conduit
financings as involving true private choice and examination of the
Johnson v. Economic Development Corp., 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1151
(2002). For practitioners' commentaries on this issue, consult Jeffrey 0. Lewis
& John E. Farina, Tax-Exempt Bond Financingfor Faith-Based Institutions:
The New Constitutional Climate, at http://www.icemiller.com/publications/29/
faithbased.html#N 3 (last visited Apr. 5, 2004) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review); Jeffrey 0. Lewis, April 2002 Update to "TaxExempt Financing for Faith-Based Organizations: The New Constitutional
Climate", at http://www.icemiller.com/lawyer-detail/id/871! index.aspx (last
visited Apr. 5, 2004) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review); Jeffrey
0. Lewis, July 2002 Update to "Tax-Exempt Financing for Faith-Based
Organizations: The New Constitutional Climate", at http://www.icemiller.com/
lawyer-detail/id/871/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2004) (on file with the
First Amendment Law Review); Jeffrey 0. Lewis, August 2002 Update to
"Tax-Exempt Financing for Faith-Based Organizations:
The New
Constitutional Climate", at http://www.icemiller.com/lawyerdetail/id/871/
index.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2004) (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review); and Jeffrey 0. Lewis, Executive Summary: The Doctrine of
Pervasive Sectarianism
&
the
Bond
Lawyer's
Dilemma,
at
http://www.icemiller.com/lawyer-detail/id/871/index.aspx, (last visited Apr. 4,
2004).
85. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion); see
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997).
86. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10.
87. Id. at 809-10, 816.
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implications of government authorization and approval of the
bonds.
(a). Neutrally Available Aid under Mitchell v. Helms
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a
federal school funding program that provided for the loan of
secular, neutral, and nonideological instructional and educational
materials to public and private nonprofit schools, including
sectarian schools. Justice Thomas, with Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy joining, applied Agostini's
modification of the Lemon test and upheld the aid program. In
assessing the government indoctrination question, the plurality
relied on the neutrality of the aid statute, concluding that "any aid
going to a religious recipient only [had] the effect of furthering [a]
secular purpose"" and did not constitute government indoctrination
where "the religious, irreligious and areligious [were] all alike
eligible for governmental aid.""
Using the principle of neutrality, a religious institution
would maintain that religious institutions are one type of
organization among many that a bond financing statute benefits in
order to further that statute's secular public purpose. In Steele, for
example, the wide range of the bond statute's beneficiaries,
including sectarian and non-sectarian educational institutions,
manufacturers and stores, succeeded in convincing the court to
validate bonds for a religiously affiliated universityi °
The Johnson court also focused on the concept that the
statute benefited a diverse group of citizens, citing Witters as an

88. Id. at 810.
89. Id. at 809 (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor, with Justice Breyer
joining, concurred in a separate opinion in Mitchell, expressing her
unwillingness to rely solely upon the neutrality of an aid statute or to tolerate
actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination. Id. at 837-38
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Diversion of government aid to
religious indoctrination was also a primary concern of Justices Souter, Stevens,
and Ginsburg who dissented in Mitchell. Id. at 890-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
90. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d
401,416, cen. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003).
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example of permissible aid to a religious institution where the
nature of the statute negated the primary effect of advancing
religion.9' Thus, under the reasoning of the Johnson court and of
the plurality in Mitchell, a bond financing statute that established
neutral criteria for awarding aid for secular purposes should not
have a primary effect of advancing religion, since the religious
principles of the benefited religious institutions would not be
attributable to the government.
(b). Private Choice as an Aspect of Neutrally Available Aid
The plurality in Mitchell, relying on Agostini92 and Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District,' also found significant the fact
that the religious institutions received aid "only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of individuals.' 94
Independent choices made by individual parents who received state
aid and chose to use the state assistance to send their children to
religious schools severed the link between government
advancement of religion and government aid. The Court reasoned
that private choices, rather than the single choice of government,
prevented the government from granting special favors that might
lead to an establishment of a religion. 5 Thus, in Zobrest, the Court
upheld the expenditure of government funds for a sign language
interpreter for a student at a sectarian high school. The funding
statute provided government assistance to disabled students
without regard to the "sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic
nature of the school. 96 In Witters, as noted above, the government
paid tuition for a blind student who chose to apply the government
funds to attend a religious college for the purpose of becoming a
religious leader. In those cases, Mitchell explained, the statutes
91. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 2001 FED App. 0015P (6th Cir.), 241
F.3d 501, 513.

92. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997).
93. 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
94. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226
(quotations omitted)).
95. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810.
96. Id. at 811 (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10).
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created no financial incentive to the individual beneficiaries to
choose sectarian schools, and thus government funding was not
attributable to a decision made by the state.97
The Mitchell plurality also compared the federal funding
statute to a state statute, upheld in Mueller v. Allen,9" that allowed a
state income tax deduction for educational expenses, whether
related to public schools or private schools, sectarian or nonsectarian. The statute the Court considered in Mueller "neutrally
provide[d] state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens."" and
thus "no 'imprimatur of state approval' [could] be deemed to have
been conferred on any particular religion or on religion
generally."'' 0 Thus, to the Mitchell plurality, private choice and
neutrality were the main° determinants of the constitutionality of a
0
government aid statute.
Using the logic of Mitchell, a religious institution could
assert that bonds issued for its benefit were valid, because bond
purchasers would direct bond proceeds to the religious institution
as a part of a neutral program that provided benefits under a bond
statute to a broad spectrum of organizations. The Steele court
accepted this reasoning, holding that, because individual
bondholders, not the government, furnished loan proceeds in a taxexempt bond financing, the extension of aid in the form of tax
exemption did not result in governmental indoctrination. Virginia

97. Id. at 811-12.
98. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
99. Id. at 398-99, see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (quoting this
description from Mueller).
100. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397).
101. Id. at 830. The Mitchell plurality also rejected the idea that aid must
pass literally through private hands in order to avoid an Establishment Clause
violation, saying that "there is no reason why the Establishment Clause
requires such a form." Id. at 813, 816. The plurality posited that the result in
Witters would not have changed if the government had sent its check directly
to the sectarian university instead of to the student. Id. at 813, 820 n.8
(plurality opinion). Justices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg objected to the
plurality's formulation, believing that under the Court's precedents aid should
not go directly to religious schools on a school-wide basis and that aid with
actual religious content should be barred. Id. at 888-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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College Building Authority v. Lynn1 1 2 also adopted this principle.
Steele and Lynn held that the actions of individual
bondholders who chose to buy bonds broke the link between the
government's issuance of bonds and the advancement of religion.
These cases rested on Establishment Clause cases relying on the
private choices of individuals to obviate the appearance of
governmental support for a sectarian institution. For example,
using the same rationale as Mitchell, the Supreme Court in Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris'3 upheld Ohio's school voucher program against
an Establishment Clause challenge, even though most vouchers
were used at pervasively sectarian primary and secondary schools.""
Relying upon Mueller, Witter, and Zobrest, the Court decided that
the voucher program did not have the forbidden effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion, because individual choices made by a broad
class of citizens directed government aid to religious schools. The
Court explained, "The incidental advancement of a religious
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is
reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not the
government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. '1
Thus, in Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, Mitchell, and Zelman, Supreme
Court Justices have relied upon the argument that individual choice
could break the connection between the government and a religious
institution and thus avoid an Establishment Clause violation.1 °(' The

102. 538 S.E.2d 682, 698-99 (Va. 2000).
103. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, and Justices O'Connor
and Thomas each concurred separately.
104. Id. at 663 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
105. Id. at 652.
106. In contrast to the Court's reliance on the "private choice" theory in
the cases cited above, the Court's decision in Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), suggests that state sponsorship of a
religious institution, evidenced by the government's adoption of a bond
resolution and entering into a loan agreement with a religious institution, may
be of critical significance to the Court's analysis. In Santa Fe, Justice Stevens's
majority opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg
and Souter, held that a school district abridged religious liberty where the
district's policy encouraged a student speaker selected by majority vote of his
fellow students to deliver religious messages at football games. Id. at 306, 316-
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Supreme Court has not yet adopted the reasoning in Steele and
Lynn that the choices of bondholders are comparable to the choices
of parents in the voucher and other state aid cases.
The "private choice" argument is strained, since private
investors also furnish moneys to purchase bonds issued by a
government to finance traditional improvements such as streets and
sewers. A government cannot issue bonds except for a proper
public purpose.'07 As a result of this rule, the actions of private
investors in a traditional financing must not sever the link between
the government's borrowing and the advancement of its public
purpose of providing streets and sewers. Similarly, the actions of
bondholders must not step between the government's issuance of
conduit bonds and the advancement of its secular purpose. In
either case, if bondholder choice broke the connection between the
government's advancement of a public purpose and the issuance of
the bonds, then the government would not have authority to issue
the bonds.
In spite of the apparent weakness of the private choice
argument, Mitchell suggests that Justices Rehnquist, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas and would be sympathetic to the private
choice and neutrality arguments. Zelman adds Justice O'Connor
and Justice Breyer as possible supporters based upon private
choice, although their concurrence emphasized that, in the "true
private choice programs" in Witters and Zobrest, "[t]he fact that aid
flow[ed] to the religious school and [was] used for the advancement
of religion [was] ...wholly dependent on the student's private
decision. '" As discussed below, the government's role is crucial in
17. The fact that an individual student, not a school district official, delivered
the prayers did not act as a "circuit-breaker" between state sponsorship and
private action. Id at 305-06, 310. While Santa Fe may be explained in part by
the Court's special concern for impressionable primary and secondary school
students and in part because only a single student, representing only one
viewpoint, was selected as speaker for the entire football season, it confirms
that the individual Justices' characterizations of the role of the government in
a conduit financing would be critical to their determination of the
Establishment Clause issues. See infra Sections II(B)(1)(c) and (d).
107. 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Securities and Obligations § 92 (2001).
108. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 842 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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a conduit financing, and the fact that aid would flow to a religious
institution and be used for the advancement of religion would not
be wholly dependent on bondholders' private decisions.
(c). The Role of Government Choice in Conduit Financings
To analyze the "individual bondholder choice" argument
and thus determine whether the indoctrination that occurs at
religious institutions is attributable to the government in a conduit
financing, a court should examine two important government
decisions that a successful tax-exempt bond transaction requires.
Under federal law, a governmental body and an elected official'
select the religious institutions for whose benefit the governmental
body will issue bonds. The resolution that the governmental entity
adopts to authorize issuance of the bonds and the applicable elected
official's TEFRA approval"" must satisfy the constitutional
prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion." '
Congress enacted the public notice and elected official
approval requirements to eliminate inappropriate uses of taxexempt financing and to help restore the benefit of tax-exempt
financing for traditional government purposes. To determine
whether a bond issue serves a legitimate purpose, federal tax law
requires that elected representatives of the governmental unit
determine, following a public hearing, that the bonds provide a
substantial public benefit. 2 The government choice that federal
law mandates distinguishes tax-exempt bond financing from the
programs the Court approved in Witters, Zobrest, and Mitchell. A
court might reasonably attribute the indoctrination that occurs at

109. As an alternative, voters in the jurisdiction where the project is
located may approve the bonds. See supra note 16.
110. See supra note 16.
111. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, local governments as well as
the state itself can make no law respecting an establishment of religion. See
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1947) (referring to the resolution the
school board adopted authorizing reimbursement to parents of moneys
expended by them for bus transportation).
112. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d
401, 414 n.9, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003).
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religious institutions seeking support through tax-exempt bonds to
the government instrumentality and the applicable elected official
and not to the individual bondholders. Under this view, the
resolution authorizing the issuance of the bonds would constitute a
law respecting an establishment of religion. The resolution adopted
by the government instrumentality with respect to an individual
project for a pervasively sectarian institution would constitute an
additional legislative action, not present in Agostini and Mitchell,
which might have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion, even though the state bond financing statute was a neutral
law with a secular purpose that did not have such an effect.
In some states, judicial interpretation has lent force to the
argument that issuance of bonds by a governmental entity
constitutes prohibited government support for the benefited
institution. For example, like other state constitutions, the Ohio
constitution prohibits lending of credit in aid of private
corporations by the state and by municipalities and other local
governments."' In 1964, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that
issuance of conduit bonds by a local government was a lending of4
entity."
credit by the government to the benefited for-profit private
Responding to this reading of the state constitution, Ohio voters
amended the Ohio constitution " ' to authorize cities and counties to
lend their credit in aid of private entities by issuing bonds to
support private enterprises engaging in industry, commerce,
distribution and research." 6 In State ex rel. Taft v. Campanella,"'
the court expressed a similar view with respect to nonprofit
corporations, stating that "a non-profit corporation whose primary
function [was] for a public purpose [was] not prohibited from

113. OHIO CONsT. art. VIII, §§ 4, 6.

114. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 197 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ohio 1964). In
Brand, the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated conduit bonds benefiting a
private for-profit corporation as an unconstitutional lending of the state's
credit. Id.
115. OHIO CONsT. art. VIII, § 13.
116. County of Stark v. Ferguson, 440 N.E.2d 816, 819-20 (Ohio App.
1981).

117. 368 N.E.2d 76, 85 (Ohio App. 1977), affd, 364 N.E.2d 21 (Ohio
1977).
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obtaining the benefit of government credit in the form of revenue
bonds.""', The Ohio court's interpretation that conduit bonds by
their nature constituted a lending of the state's credit to a private
beneficiary bolsters the argument that issuance of tax-exempt
bonds is more than a government service. Issuance of bonds is a
positive action by the government that could be said to have a
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion because the tenets
of the benefited religious institution would be attributable to the
government.
Even in states in which a city, county, or other local
government creates a separate non-governmental entity for the
purpose of issuing bonds,"9 governmental approval is critical to the
validity of tax-exempt bonds and the appearance of governmental
indoctrination must be addressed.
Under federal law, a
governmental instrumentality, whether a state or local government
or the creation of a state or local government, must be the issuer of
the bonds. The government instrumentality lends proceeds of the
government's bonds to the religious institution. The religious
institution repays the loan pursuant to a loan agreement between
the government instrumentality and the religious institution. The
government instrumentality's bonds contain an agreement to repay
the bondholders, albeit from revenues derived from the conduit
borrower under the loan agreement. An elected official or the
voters of the jurisdiction in which the project is located are required
to give TEFRA approval of the bonds.12 1 Even though the

118. Id.
119. In these states, courts have held that issuance of conduit bonds by
the government instrumentality does not constitute an impermissible lending
of the government's credit. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion re:
Constitutionality of P.A. 1975 No. 301, 254 N.W.2d 528, 534-35 (Mich. 1977)
(concluding that, since the bonds would be issued by an entity distinct from
the state and would be payable from project revenues, the bonds were not
debt prohibited by the state constitution).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 147(f) (1994). Voter approval might avoid the
Establishment Clause issue with respect to the TEFRA approval requirement,
but not with respect -to the actions of the government instrumentality in
authorizing and issuing the bonds as discussed infra Section III(B)(1)(d).
TEFRA approval by electors might also be considered government action
under Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), since
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government instrumentality is never responsible for making
payments on the bonds and the religious institution agrees to
indemnify the government for all costs it might incur as part of the
transaction, it is troubling that federal law requires that a
governmental entity issue tax-exempt bonds and a governmental
official approve the bonds, if the role of the government is
insignificant.
(d). Significance of the Government's Selection of Benefited
Institutions
This subsection will examine whether the government
approval of a conduit financing for a religious institution
conclusively determines that the indoctrination that occurs at
religious institutions is attributable to the government. It will first
consider the significance of government selection of religious
institutions benefited by conduit financing and then focus on the
consequences of the government's role, examining the importance
of public perception of government support.
(i). The Selection Process
Examples from the executive and judicial branches suggest
that the government can identify organizations as religious and
confer or refuse to confer benefits upon those institutions. A
religious institution could argue, for example, that the approval by
the Internal Revenue Service of 501(c)(3) status for a religious
institution is comparable to the adoption of a bond resolution
approving the issuance of tax-exempt bonds to assist a religious
institution whose project would further secular goals. In conferring
tax-exempt status to a religious institution, the IRS makes no
inquiry into doctrine; it only examines the use of the religious
institution's money to ensure that the institution, not a private
individual, receives the support."
The executive branch of state government also provides
the government would sponsor the election procedures. See supra note 106
and accompanying text.
121. 4 BORIS BIITKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND

Gwrs

100.3.3 (2d ed. 1989).
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instances of government decisions affecting religious institutions.
The Texas Attorney General, for example, interpreted a statutory
definition of "religious worship" in order to determine whether
certain property was exempt from state ad valorem property
taxes.1 22 Courts have also addressed the issue of defining "religious
institution" and thus courts select religious institutions for favors
and deny privileges to other organizations. For example, in United
States v. Meyers, the Tenth Circuit determined that the Church of
Marijuana was a philosophy or way of life and not a religious
institution with religious tenets that could excuse a criminal
conviction for use of marijuana. 124 The Tenth Circuit did not appear
to believe that if the court made the determination that a
philosophy constituted a religion worthy of protection under the
Free Exercise Clause, it would thereby "establish" a religion.
Using the example of the executive and judicial branches, a
legislative body such as a city council could determine, without
inquiring into doctrine, that funding a particular religious
institution's project would support the governmental authority's
secular goals. A governmental authority would select and lend
bond proceeds to a religious institution not because of the religious
character of the church, but because its project fulfilled a secular
public purpose. Allowing a government issuer to select which
projects would fulfill public purposes was one of the goals of

122. Op. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. MW-553 (1982).
123. 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996).

124. Id. at 1484; see also Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372
F. Supp. 770, 776 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (allowing First Amendment protection for a
church with no defined creed but which offered degrees in divinity studies); cf
Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (holding that the disallowance
by the IRS of a charitable deduction for auditing fees paid by church members
did not violate the Establishment Clause). Hernandez held that "routine
regulatory interaction which involveld] no inquiries into religious doctrine, ....
no delegation of state power to a religious body.... and no 'detailed
monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and religious
bodies... [did] not of itself violate the non-entanglement command." Id. at
696-97 (citations omitted); see also Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App.
0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d 401, 412, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003) (quoting

the above language from Hernandez).
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25

TEFRA
In general, a local government has discretion to choose
which institutions it will assist. Government instrumentalities make
distinctions among citizens at every meeting, subject to equal
protection, due process and other constitutional provisions.
Clearly, a government instrumentality that only agreed to issue taxexempt bonds for the religious institutions attended by members of
its governing body would be unconstitutional. For example, in
Williams v. Lara, the court held that a prison rehabilitation
program that created a separate unit within the prison for inmates
volunteering to attend instruction in a Christian religious
curriculum reflecting only the views of the sheriff and chaplain
Absent constitutional
violated the Establishment Clause. 27
be required to
objections, however, public bodies would not
128
S
In Riverview
provide support to every applicant for assistance.
l for
Investments, Inc., v. Ottawa Community Improvement Corp.,29

example, the court concluded that a quasi-governmental body was
entitled to turn down an application for tax-exempt financing.
Similarly, in Steele, the court observed:
Congress delegated to [local governmental
authorities issuing tax-exempt bonds] an
element of control over local economic
development. The revenue bonds serve as a

125. Steele, 301 F.3d at 414.
126. 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001).
127. Id. at 176.
128. See infra note 251 for discussion of Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley.
129. 769 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1985).
130. Id. at 327. In Riverview, the bond financing statute required the
approval of a Community Improvement Corporation (CIC) before a city
could issue conduit bonds. Id. at 326. The reason for disapproval was that the
CIC members did not want economic competition for their own businesses. Id.
at 328. This approval process was not a due process violation; in the court's
words, "[A]n entitlement does not arise just because the [CIC] has approved
the bond applications of other applicants. The approval of other applications
does not in itself create a legitimate expectation of entitlement on the part of
the plaintiff. Since the [CICI did not deprive plaintiff of a property right in the
bonds, there has been no constitutional violation." Id. at 327.
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means of financing local preferences.
For
example, a local government might conclude
that the issuance of an industrial revenue bond
to a new business could give a competitive
disadvantage to an existing business which had
not received such conduit financing and result
in economic displacement, rather than
development.131
A local government might have a legitimate governmental
interest in turning down a religious institution's application for taxexempt financing, related to fulfilling the secular public purpose of
the statute, but unrelated to the governmental body's opinions of
the religious institution's tenets. For example, in a different
context, in St. Paul's Protestant Episcopal Church v. City of
Oakwood,12 a city's zoning code prevented a church from
constructing a parking lot on property it owned that was not
immediately adjacent to the tract upon which the church building
was located. The court determined that, even if St. Paul's were the
only church in Oakwood that the zoning code prevented from
building a parking lot, the City would not have committed an equal
protection violation, since the City was not basing its building
permit denial upon the religious views of the church members.'33
Government officials might have valid reasons unrelated to
constitutional issues, such as zoning concerns, for giving a benefit to
one institution but not to another.
131. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d
401, 414, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003).
132. No. C-3-88-230, 1998 WL 1657172 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 1998).
133. St. Paul's Protestant Episcopal Church, 1998 WL 1657172, at *7.

The court also determined that the denial of a parking lot permit did not
burden St. Paul's free exercise of religion, since the City regulated its ability to
build a parking lot, not the beliefs of its members. Id. In AI-Salam Mosque
Foundation v. City of Palos Heights, No. 00 C 4596, 2001 WL 204772 (N.D. I11.

Mar. 1,2001), the court held that a mosque stated a claim for relief when it
alleged that a city burdened the free exercise of religion by preventing a
religious organization from buying land on which to build a place of worship,
,,a core religious practice," but denied summary judgment so that it could be
established whether the denial was based on permissible procedural grounds
that did not involve a constitutional violation. Id. at *2-*3.
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The government's ability to select projects, however, might
result, albeit unintentionally, in favoring some religious institutions
over others. A governmental body could issue bonds to benefit a
religious institution and then properly exercise its discretion and
refuse to approve bonds for a second religious institution. Even
though the governmental body would have expressed a "local
preference," as Congress intended when it enacted TEFRA,' 4 a
court might find that issuance of bonds for the first, favored
religious institution constituted the establishment of a religion.
Even if a city council scrupulously avoided discrimination among
religious institutions, it might inadvertently "establish" a particular
religious institution as the only religious institution in the city that
the government had approved, even though it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for turning down a second religious
institution's application.
Another concern is the possibility that the government
would not act in good faith. Government officials would be likely
to give no reasons for their refusal to approve bonds for the benefit
of an obscure or unpopular religious sect rather than to
acknowledge discriminatory views. Under the rule Justice Thomas
enunciated in Mitchell, it could be argued that a conduit bond
financing statute would provide for neutral government aid as
between nonreligious and religious institutions, and among
religious institutions. It is not clear, however, that, in practice,
neutrality among religions would be maintained when the
legislative body acted. A similar argument persuaded the Court in
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet.'11 In Kiryas Joel, a state statute enacted solely to benefit
one religious community did not withstand Establishment Clause
scrutiny,
even though, as Justice Scalia argued in dissent, there
was no reason to believe that the legislature would not
accommodate another
religious community that made a request for
S.
137
similar legislation.
One can imagine that a city council might

134. Steele, 301 F.3d at 414.

135. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
136. id. at 703.
137. Id. at 745-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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favor the religious institutions with the greatest number of
members, representing those congregants who elected the council
members. Even if the governmental instrumentality were willing to
support all institutions, however, religious institutions with fewer
members or less wealthy members might be excluded from the
benefits of tax-exempt financing if they lacked resources to pay
costs associated with a transaction. Thus, religious institutions for
which financing was provided would appear to have government
support, while others did not. A conduit bond program that,
realistically, only large religious institutions could take advantage of
would risk conveying the message of religious favoritism. This
possibility, and the danger of actually supporting a particular type
of religious practice, would exist regardless of whether the issuer
intended that the program have that effect.
(ii) Public Perception and the Appearance of Government
Imprimatur
Even if a local government established an effective way to
accommodate all religious institutions applying for assistance and
perfected the ability to turn down an application in a way that
would not violate any constitutional provisions," ' the issuance of
bonds for a religious institution would raise the issue of whether the
reasonable observer would perceive the bond issuance as
government support for the advancement of religion. The name of
the bonds-for example, "City of Yourtown Revenue Bonds (The
Main Street Church Project)"-would evidence a troubling
symbolic link between the government and the benefited religious
institution. Imagine that the issue were exacerbated by the church's
decision to post a sign in front of its building saying the following:
The Main Street Church thanks the City of
Yourtown for its support of our church and our
congregation by its issuance of City of
Yourtown Revenue Bonds (The Main Street
Church Project) to finance the construction of

138. For example, selections of religious institutions could not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. St. Paul's Protestant Episcopal Church, 1998 WL
1657172, at *7-*8.
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our new sanctuary. Mayor Mary Smith of the
City of Yourtown has approved construction of
the sanctuary and the bonds issued to finance
that construction. Her approval was requiredto
satisfy Section 147(f) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended.
While the church's statements would be true, only bond
lawyers, public officials familiar with conduit bonds, and bond
purchasers would understand the significance of any disclaimer.
Participants in the tax-exempt bond market will comprehend the
indirect nature of the government subsidy. The concept that a
conduit bond issue does not pledge the taxing power of the
government might be difficult to convey to the public.
Justice O'Connor has expressed concern about the public's
perception of government support for religious institutions,
suggesting that she would examine closely whether the structure of
a conduit loan would cause the reasonable observer to perceive the
issuance of bonds as government support for the advancement of
religion. Concurring in Lynch v. Donnelly,"' for example, she said,
"What is crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement or
disapproval of religion.' 40 Similarly, dissenting in Agostini, Justice
Souter asserted, "Government promotes religion as effectively
when it fosters a close identification of its powers and
responsibilities with those of any-or all-religious denominations
14
'
as when it attempts to inculcate specific religious doctrines.'
Addressing the issue of perception in Agostini, and writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor rejected the idea that placing a public
school employee on a parochial school campus to provide remedial
education to disadvantaged children created an impermissible
symbolic link between the government and religion.'42 Concurring
in Mitchell, Justice O'Connor distinguished between a program of

139.
140.
141.
(citations
142.

465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 692.
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 242 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting)
omitted).
Id. at 223-24.
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true private choice, where "endorsement of the religious message
[was] reasonably attributed to the individuals who select[ed] the
path of the aid,"' '4' and a per capita aid program, in which, "if the
religious school [used] the aid to inculcate religion in its students, it
[was] reasonable to say that the government [had] communicated a
message of endorsement.' 14 In the latter case, "the reasonable
observer would naturally perceive the aid program as government
support for the advancement of religion.''
The majority in
Zelman spoke to this concern of Justice O'Connor, explaining that,
with respect to vouchers, "Any objective observer familiar with the
full history and context of the Ohio program would reasonably view
it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in
failed schools,
not as an endorsement of religious schooling in
6
general."11
These Justices' focus on the importance of perception
reflects a concern about the potential for a government action to
foster "[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious
lines."'47 Although recent cases have
• 1 48 minimized the importance of
the avoidance of religious conflict, Lemon and cases relying on
Lemon identify avoiding divisiveness as one purpose of the
Establishment Clause's proscription against laws respecting an
establishment of religion. Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer have alluded to religious strife in recent dissents. In their
view, the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause reflected
the Framers' intention to prevent "the religious strife that had long
plagued the nations of Europe.' ' 149 Justice Breyer, with Justices
Stevens and Souter joining, embraced earlier Establishment Clause
analysis in cases which "recognized the anguish, hardship and bitter
strife that could come when zealous religious groups struggle[d]

143. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 843 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
144. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
145. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
146. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002).
147. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,623 (1971).
148. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 661 n.7 (deriding Justice Breyer's
concerns that Ohio's school voucher program would result in discord).
149. Id. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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with one another to obtain the Government's stamp of approval.'
Similarly, in his dissent in Zelman, Justice Stevens wrote:
Admittedly, in reaching [the] conclusion [that
the decision in Zelman is profoundly
misguided] I have been influenced by my
understanding of the impact of religious strife
on the decisions of our forbears to migrate to
this continent, and on the decisions of
neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland,
and the Middle East to mistrust one another.
Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that
was designed to separate religion and
government, we increase the risk of religious
strife and 51weaken the foundation of our
1
democracy.
An early state court case examined the issue of political
fragmentation in the context of tax-exempt bonds. Focusing on the
neutrality of the statute, the court dismissed the possibility of
religious strife as a result of issuance of tax-exempt bonds for a
sectarian hospital. Wisconsin Health Facilities Authority 52 found
that political divisiveness, potentially present if the institutions of
only one religious group were favored, would not exist where a
broad range of religious and non-religious institutions were eligible
for aid in the form of tax-exempt bond financing. In that situation,
the court rejected the argument "that potential competition among
hospitals would generate controversy and would invite charges of
religious discrimination where a nonreligiously aligned hospital was
aided in preference to a religiously aligned hospital or one
denomination was favored over another denomination.' 3
A sectarian institution seeking tax-exempt financing
assistance for religious improvements would need to convince the
court that a reasonable observer would be aware of the secular
purposes of the bond financing statute, in spite of the title of the

150. Id. (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 685-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. 280 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. 1979).

153. Id. at 782.
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bonds. The court would need to address the public's perception of
a financing for a religious institution and whether the bond issuance
created a symbolic link between the benefited religious institution
and the government. Statements in the bonds themselves and in
the official statement or other disclosure document for the issue
indicating that the bonds were not a pledge of the full faith and
credit of the government, that no taxes would be levied to pay debt
service on the bonds, that no recourse existed against the
government for non-payment, that the bonds were issued for a
secular public purpose, and that the issuance of the bonds was not
the equivalent of government sanction of the religious tenets of the
benefited institution would facilitate a conclusion that the financing
was purely a conduit and not an endorsement of religion. Adding
similar statements to the notice of public hearing and to the
applicable elected official's certificate approving the bonds would
bolster the perception that no government support for the
advancement of religion existed.14
Resolving the issue of government selection would be
critical. Cases that discount the importance of the government's
power to choose projects for conduit financing do not answer the
question why federal law requires government approval to create
the bonds' tax-exempt status. If state and federal statutes allowed

154. See the discussion in the district court's opinion in Steele v.
Industrial Development Board, 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, 730-734 (M.D. Tenn.
2000), rev'd, 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d 401, cert. denied, 537

U.S. 1188 (2003), of the perception of government endorsement of religion, in
which the court objected to the lack of disclaimers in the official statement
disassociating the government instrumentality from the descriptions of the
religious tenets of the benefiting university. Cases concerning holiday displays
at government buildings have reached differing, fact-based conclusions
concerning whether holiday displays constitute Establishment Clause
violations, because they convey the perception of government endorsement of
a particular religion. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 601-02 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683
(1984). This issue of public perception also arises with respect to invocations
and other prayers at government meetings, see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 786 (1983) (finding no government imprimatur), and at high schools. See
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992) (finding that prayer at a middle
school graduation "bore the imprint of the State").
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issuance of tax-exempt bonds by religious institutions and other
501(c)(3) corporations for any of their permitted purposes without
directly involving government authorization and approval of the
bonds, then no imprimatur of government approval would exist.
Congress has made the determination, however, that governmental
involvement is necessary to confer tax exemption.
This
requirement precludes reaching an easy conclusion that conduit
financings for religious institutions would not have a primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion on the ground that the issuance
of bonds would not result in governmental indoctrination. It would
be difficult to maintain that the government's issuance of taxexempt bonds for the benefit of a religious institution did not
violate the Establishment Clause unless other Agostini factors, such
as the nature of the aid, could negate the appearance of
governmental indoctrination that the title and structure of a conduit
loan to a religious institution would convey.156
(2). The Statute May Not Have a Primary Effect of Advancing or
Inhibiting Religion by Creating an Excessive Entanglement
Between Church and State
This section will discuss the excessive entanglement prong
of the Lemon-Agostini test. Excessive entanglement involves
consideration of the character and purposes of the institution
benefited, the nature of the aid, and the resulting relationship
between government and religious authority.
(a). Excessive Entanglement Involves the Considerationof the
Characterand Purposes of the Institution Benefited
The character of a religious institution is pervasively
sectarian, and its purpose includes religious indoctrination.'
To
155. See Spina, supra note 15, at 49-50.
156. See infra Section III(B)(2)(b).
157. Courts have used a variety of criteria to determine whether a
particular institution is pervasively sectarian. See supra note 6; see also Steele
v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, 706 (M.D. Tenn. 2000), rev'd, 2002
FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d 401, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003)
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avoid excessive entanglement between church and state, the
Supreme Court has stated that it would invalidate direct aid to a
pervasively sectarian institution, even if the aid itself were secular.'5'
Recent cases suggest, however, that a plurality of the Supreme
Court is ready to abandon the pervasively sectarian test entirely, "
so that the pervasively sectarian nature of a religious institution
would not automatically invalidate aid to the institution. Thus, the
plurality opinion of Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Kennedy in Mitchell stated, "[T]he religious nature of a recipient
should not matter to the constitutional analysis, so long as the
recipient adequately furthers the government's secular purpose. '
The Mitchell plurality rejected the importance of examining
whether an institution was pervasively
sectarian,'16' describing the
.
,,162
test as one with "a shameful pedigree,
"born of bigotry [that]
should be buried now.""" The plurality viewed the examination of
a person's beliefs required by a focus on whether a school was
pervasively sectarian as offensive and6 contrary to the viewpoint

discrimination cases'6 discussed below.1 5

Federal appeals courts and at least one state supreme court
have applied the reasoning of the Mitchell plurality to uphold taxexempt bonds for sectarian schools. Relying on the plurality
(describing cases enunciating tests that determine whether an organization is
pervasively sectarian). These factors indicate that a church, synagogue,
mosque, or temple is pervasively sectarian, and this article will treat the issue
as settled.
158. See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976).
159. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d
401,408-09, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003).
160. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827 (2000) (plurality opinion).

161. The Court focused on the factors relating to government
indoctrination or definition of aid recipients by reference to religion and not
on the question of whether the schools receiving loans of materials were
pervasively sectarian. The Court did not examine excessive entanglement or
purpose, since petitioners did not raise those issues.
162. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828 (plurality opinion). The Court's reference
was to anti-Catholic sentiment. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

163. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829.
164. Id.
165. See infra Section IV.
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opinion in Mitchell, Steele and Johnson cast doubt upon the
importance of the pervasively sectarian nature of the benefited
institution in examining tax-exempt bond financings for sectarian
schools. While the judges writing for the majority in Steele and
Johnson felt constrained by the fact that a majority of the Supreme
Court has not disavowed the pervasively sectarian rule, Judge
Nelson, concurring in Johnson, relying on Mitchell, "register[ed] a
lack of enthusiasm for any suggestion that conduit financing of the
sort provided by the Oakland County Economic Development
Corporation would necessarily violate the Establishment Clause if
extended to a 'pervasively sectarian' educational institution .'16
Similarly, in Steele, the Sixth Circuit questioned the vitality of the
pervasively sectarian test in light of the plurality opinion in
Mitchell. Because a majority of the Supreme Court had not
repudiated the pervasively sectarian test, the Sixth Circuit declined
to hold that the pervasively sectarian doctrine was no longer good
law. The court concluded instead that, given the nature of the aid
in question, the issuance
of the bonds did not offend the
67
Establishment Clause.1
In Virginia College Building Authority v. Lynn,6 ' the
Virginia Supreme Court determined that Regent University was
pervasively sectarian, 69 but identified forms of aid to pervasively
sectarian institutions that the Supreme Court had approved, such as
the loan of educational materials in Mitchell, the provision of public
school teachers to provide remedial education upheld in Agostini,
the state funded sign language interpreter in Zobrest, and the
income tax deduction for tuition, textbooks, and transportation
upheld in Mueller.170 In those cases, the Lynn court said, the
Supreme Court had upheld assistance based upon the nature of the
aid the government provided. As discussed below, the Lynn court,
using the Footnote 7 analysis, determined that the nature of the aid
166. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 2001 FED App. 0015P (6th Cir.), 241
F.3d 501, 518 (Nelson, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
167. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d
401, 409, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003).
168. Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 2000).
169. Id. at 698.
170. Id. at 694-95.
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in a conduit issue did not preclude aid to a pervasively sectarian
university."'7
Thus, courts have begun to consider the relevancy of Hunt's
pervasively sectarian test. It appears that four members of the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas,
Scalia, and Kennedy, would be willing to reexamine whether Hunt's
reliance on the non-pervasively sectarian nature of the college
receiving tax-exempt bond proceeds was necessary to upholding the
validity of the tax-exempt bonds in that case.
The views of the dissenting and concurring Justices in
Mitchell will be critical to a court's resolution of the issue, since
Justices O'Connor, Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg, and Breyer continue
to resist direct aid to pervasively sectarian institutions.'72 In
addition to stating her concern in Mitchell 73 about whether the
reasonable observer would perceive an aid program as government
support for the advancement of religion, for example, Justice
O'Connor expressed discomfort with the plurality's reliance on the
neutrality of an aid statute and with the plurality's apparent
willingness
to allow
actual diversion of government aid to religious
....
174
indoctrination. Thus, the nature of the aid the state provides in a
tax-exempt financing, discussed below, will be a significant
consideration in validating tax-exempt bonds for religious

171. The court also prohibited the use of bond proceeds to finance
chapels or the divinity school, but based its prohibition upon Virginia
constitutional and statutory prohibitions and upon an express prohibition in
the bond resolution. id. at 699. The court's adoption of the Footnote 7
analysis, as discussed below, indicates that, in the absence of those state law
restrictions, the court would have permitted financing of religious facilities.
See infra note 241.
172. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
Supreme Court precedent). Until the Supreme Court addresses the question
of the validity of tax-exempt bonds for religious projects, lower courts must
ground their determinations of the issue in those propositions agreed to by a
majority of the Supreme Court. As a result of this rule, any decision by a
lower court with respect to such tax-exempt bonds is likely to be appealed to
the Supreme Court.
173. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 843 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
174. Id. at 837-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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institutions.
(b). Excessive Entanglement Involves the Considerationof the
Nature of the Aid the State Provides
Proceeds of government bonds issued to finance a project
for a sectarian institution unquestionably would be used for
religious purposes. Therefore, a court would need to examine
whether the nature of the aid in a tax-exempt bond financing
constituted a diversion of government funds to support religion and
created an excessive entanglement between church and state. The
religious institution could concede that the purpose of the
Establishment Clause was to prevent the government from
compelling citizens to write a check to a religious institution, and
still contend that a conduit issue was not the equivalent of forcing
citizens to contribute their money to the support of a religious
institution."

175. See JAMES MADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments (1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 300
(Robert A. Rutland et al eds., 1973). In this influential tract, Madison
asserted:
Who does not see that the same authority which can
establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions,
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects'? That the same
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three
pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other
establishment in all cases whatsoever'?
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947) (quoting JAMES MADISON,
supra, at 300). Madison's Remonstrance appears to retain its influence on
some members of the Court. See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870-71 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). A direct grant of money to a religious institution to support its
religious mission appears to remain impermissible for the moment. Justice
Thomas acknowledged in Mitchell that " 'special Establishment Clause
dangers' " exist "when money is given to religious schools or entities directly
rather than, as in Witters and Mueller, indirectly." Id. at 818-19 (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995))
(emphasis in original). As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent, however,
Justice Thomas's logic indicates that he would consider direct aid to religious
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The plurality in Mitchell explained that, so long as the aid
had no religious content and eligibility was determined in a
constitutionally permissible manner, use of the aid to indoctrinate
would not be attributable to the government.'76 The Court noted
that the actual use of funds in Zobrest to fund a sign language
interpreter and in Witters to fund tuition reimbursement for a blind
person training for the ministry was not held unconstitutional, even
though "[d]iversion was guaranteed.' ' 177 Thus, under the plurality
opinion, a court validating tax-exempt financing for a religious
institution would need to conclude that the aid provided to the
religious institution did not have impermissible content.
One possibility would be to view the content of the "aid" as
money-proceeds of a government bond issue-that the religious
institution
was inevitably and impermissibly diverting to religious
'78
use. Under this analysis, the court might view the loan of money
certain to be converted to religious use differently from the loan of
movie projectors and computers to sectarian schools in Mitchell.
The plurality upheld that loan, since the materials had no
impermissible content, even though they could be diverted to
religious use. The question would remain whether the aid being
diverted, the proceeds of a conduit bond issue, constituted
"government" funds. Since the money used to make the loan to the
religious institutions would be furnished by private investors, not by
taxpayers, and the loan would be repaid solely from revenues of the
religious institution and not from government funds, the court
could conclude that no unlawful diversion of government funds had
occurred. Under this analysis, the "aid" might be considered the
provision of the governmental service of tax exemption 7 1 for

institutions to be acceptable so long as it were made available on a neutral
basis. Id. at 900 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820.
177. Id. at 821.
178. This issue would be of greatest concern in a state that considered
the lending of bond proceeds to be a lending of the state's credit to the
benefited religious institution, but as discussed below, the question would
need to be considered even in the absence of such a state rule in order to
address the issues the Mitchell concurrence raised.
179. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (quoting Hunt's
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projects that met the secular purpose of the statute. Like the movie
projectors and computers lent to secular schools in Mitchell, the aid
itself, namely, the provision of tax exemption, would have no
religious content that could be attributed to the government. No
government indoctrination would take place, since the purpose of
the government assistance would be to fulfill the government's
secular objectives. Like the interpreter in Zobrest, the government
would not be inculcating a religious message, but merely providing
a service comparable to the service it provided to other nonprofit
entities that furthered the state's public purpose. Under this
analysis, provision of aid in the form of a tax-exempt loan to a
pervasively sectarian institution would not violate the
Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the question directly.
Roemer,"" which upheld direct government aid to sectarian
institutions that were not pervasively sectarian, indicated that the
Supreme Court viewed Hunt,"' the leading case upholding the
issuance of conduit bonds for a sectarian college, as establishing the
rule that state aid may not benefit a pervasively sectarian
institution. By relying on Hunt, Roemer implied that aid in the
form of tax-exempt bond proceeds could not benefit a pervasively
sectarian institution. The majority in Johnson also interpreted
Hunt as explicitly prohibiting the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for
a pervasively sectarian institution. It noted that a majority of the
Supreme Court had not disavowed the pervasively sectarian test
and that "it [was] Justice O'Connor's opinion, which [did] not
abolish the distinction between 'pervasively sectarian' and
'sectarian' institutions.., that [was] controlling upon [the]
Court."'8 As noted by the district court in Steele, the Supreme
Court in Rosenberger "implicitly recognized the bond proceed loan
structure in [Hunt] as an example of direct state aid" by citing Hunt
for the proposition that "special Establishment Clause dangers

Footnote 7).
180. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
181. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
182. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 2001 FED App. 0015P (6th Cir.), 241
F.3d 501, 510 n.2.
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[exist] where the government makes direct money payments to
sectarian institutions. ' "
Hunt, however, stands for a proposition that is the inverse
of the rule described in Roemer, Johnson, and Rosenberger. Hunt
held that the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for the benefit of a
sectarian college would not have the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, because the evidence showed that the college
was not pervasively sectarian and the project being financed was
subject to a restriction against religious use. The Court established
these factors as sufficient to determine that the statute did not have
a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Hunt, however,
neither held that only transactions meeting these requirements
would be upheld nor that tax-exempt bonds could not be issued to
fund religious activities. Rather, in Footnote 7, the Court reserved
the question whether the tax exemption was comparable to the
local property
tax exemption for religious institutions that Walz' '
5
upheld.'1
Embracing the Footnote 7 analysis and allowing tax-exempt
bond proceeds to benefit a religious institution would not require
the Supreme Court to overrule Hunt. Instead, the Court would
need to recast its holdings in Roemer and Hunt to make clear that
tax-exempt bond financings were excluded from the prohibition
against providing aid to pervasively sectarian institutions. Steele
would provide the Supreme Court the outline of the argument.
Steele relied upon a line of Supreme Court cases, beginning with
Walz, which upheld tax exemptions for religious property and tax
deductions for taxpayers contributing to religious institutions as not
violative of the Establishment Clause.
In Walz, the Court upheld a real property tax exemption
that extended to property used exclusively for religious,
educational, or charitable purposes and owned by a nonprofit entity
183. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, 719-20 (M.D. Tenn.
2000) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
842 (1995)), rev'd, 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d 401, cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1188 (2003).
184. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
185. The Johnson majority also found it unnecessary to reach the issue
concerning the nature of the aid. Johnson, 241 F.3d at 511 n.3.
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organized for religious, educational, or charitable purposes. The
Court rejected the argument that the grant of an exemption
indirectly coerced taxpayers to make a contribution to religious
bodies and thereby violated provisions prohibiting establishment of
religion under the First Amendment. The Court concluded that
"the grant of a tax exemption [was] not sponsorship since the
government [did] not transfer part of its revenue to churches, but
simply abstain[ed] from demanding that the church support the
state. , , 8
Relying on Walz, Mueller v. Allen '87stated that an indirect
financial benefit conferred by a religiously neutral tax deduction
did not violate the First Amendment. In Mueller, the Court upheld
a tax deduction for amounts paid as school tuition, textbooks, and
transportation for public and private schools. The Mueller Court
acknowledged that religious institutions benefited substantially
from the allowance of the deduction and that the economic effect
was comparable to aid given directly to the schools. The Court,
however, also noted that "legislatures have especially broad
latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes."' 88
Moreover, the receipt of an indirect, neutrally available benefit did
not require the conclusion that an Establishment Clause violation
had occurred.'
State courts have also upheld tax exemptions
benefiting religious institutions, rejecting the argument that tax
exemptions force owners of non-exempt property to support
religious institutions by increasing the rate of taxation against nonexempt properties in order to raise moneys not collected from taxexempt religious institutions.'9
186. Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
187. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
188. Id. at 396 (quoting Regan v. Taxation Without Representation of

Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983)).
189. Id. at 400. Similarly, courts have upheld income tax deductions for
contributions to religious institutions. A religious institution could argue that
because the Justices have approved the indirect benefit of income tax
deductions for contributions to religious institutions, which encourages
donations to religious institutions, they should approve the tax exemption of
the interest on conduit bonds for religious institutions, which would encourage
individuals to make loans to the religious institutions by purchasing bonds.
190. Gen. Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 176 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1961). Archeito
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Courts examining tax-exempt bonds have recognized, in
considering taxpayer standing issues, that other taxpayers' taxes
might increase if a state or local government chose to replace the
tax revenues it would have received through a taxable bond issue.'9 '
The plaintiffs in Steele had argued that they were required to
support the sectarian school, since their state and local taxes were
increased proportionately to offset the bondholders' exemption
from taxation. Similarly, the taxpayer objecting to the issuance of
bonds in Johnson estimated that, because the tax exemption saved
the sectarian school over $1 million, the state of Michigan lost
$68,400 in state tax revenue as a result of the exemption from state
income tax on interest paid to Michigan bondholders. ' 92 The court
agreed that this loss of state revenue was a sufficient "good-faith
pocketbook injury" 93 to confer standing upon the taxpayer to
contest the constitutionality of the issuance of bonds for the
school.' 94

In spite of granting taxpayers standing to sue, recent
decisions,
including
Steele, have
distinguished
between
impermissible grants of money that subsidize religious institutions
and tax exemptions. These courts have relied on Walz to uphold
the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for religious schools on the
ground that tax-exempt bonds were analogous to an indirect

noted that the sovereign power of the state gave it wide discretion to create
exemptions from taxation that the courts could invalidate only if "so
outrageously subversive of all the rules of fairness, as not to come so far within
the purview of this general clause, [requiring that the burdens of the state
ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens, R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2] as to
enable the court to save the citizen from oppression by declaring it to be
void." Id. at 75 (relying on In re Dorrance-Street, 4 R.I. 230, 249 (1856)). The
court also noted the historic practice of granting tax exemptions to churches in
Rhode Island that predated the adoption of the Rhode Island Constitution.
Archetto, 176 A.2d at 77.
191. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d
401, 403, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003).
192. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 2001 FED App. 0015P (6th Cir.), 241
F.3d 501, 506.
193. Id. at 507 (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434
(1952)).
194. Id. at 507-09.
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financial benefit conferred by a religiously neutral tax or
deduction.' 95 In Steele, the court acknowledged that in a conduit
financing, the potential loss of tax revenue had an impact upon
public funds"16 but, citing Walz, differentiated between subsidies
and tax exemptions. 97 The court in Johnson also cited Walz and
rejected the argument that "issuance of revenue bonds [allowed]
government funds to reach the coffers of the [sectarian school] ...
because [it] relieve[d] the [school] of costs it otherwise would have
borne and the [school] [was] thereby free to devote those resources
'
The court noted that that
towards its sectarian activities."' 98
argument had been repeatedly rejected, and quoting Roemer,99
explained, "If this were impermissible... a church could not be
protected by the police and fire departments. '"'2
The lack of a cash subsidy was also important to the
Virginia Supreme Court in Lynn, ' which upheld the issuance of
conduit bonds for a pervasively sectarian university. The court
rejected the idea that a pervasively sectarian institution could not
benefit from the issuance of tax-exempt bonds, relying on the
Footnote 7 concept that the nature of the aid in a conduit financing
does not implicate the Establishment Clause. The court focused on
the fact that no government funds were spent or pledged for
payment of the bonds, that the financing was available to all
qualified institutions without regard to religion, that there were
assurances in the bond documents that the funds would not be used
for religious instruction, and that the source of funds was bond
proceeds which the court categorized as "the result of independent
195. Steele, 301 F.3d at 413. Compare, however, State ex rel. Wisconsin
Health FacilitiesAuthority v. Lindner, 280 N.W.2d 773, 779 (Wis. 1979), which

distinguished Walz on the grounds that "there [was] no line of historical
precedent to demonstrate that this financing arrangement [would] not have a
detrimental effect on the relationship of church and state" and that "the [bond
financing statute did] not restrict the involvement of state government with
religion, as did the exemption approved in Walz." Id.
196. See Steele, 301 F.3d at 403.

197. Id. at 410 (citations omitted).
198.
199.
200.
201.

Johnson, 241 F.3d at 515.
See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976).
Johnson, 241 F.3d at 515 (emphasis omitted).
Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 2000).
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The court concluded that the

issuance of bonds did not violate the Establishment Clause, because
2
no government funds flowed to the university. 1
Thus, Steele, Johnson, and Lynn held that the nature of the
aid in a conduit financing was significant in determining whether an
Establishment Clause violation existed and distinguished between
tax exemptions and direct subsidies. Although the courts focused
on the economic realities of tax-exempt bond issues in determining
that bondholders, not government issuers, were the actual lenders
in the conduit financings they examined, they were not troubled by
the economic reality of the enormous support that the tax-exempt
bonds provide to sectarian institutions. These courts appeared to
view the link between the loss to the treasury that occurred as a
result of the issuance of tax-exempt bonds and the benefit to the
religious institution as too attenuated to constitute direct financial
support.2 °4 In contrast, the dissent in Steele objected to ignoring the
significant economic support that tax-exempt financing provides,
enabling the institution to advance its sectarian mission, a benefit
20
that could not be obtained without government participation. 5
The U.S. Supreme Court has not considered the issue
directly. The Justices' attitudes about subsidies have varied when
examining traditional tax exemptions. Justice Thomas used the
historic acceptance of property tax exemptions as an argument for
validating direct aid to religious institutions, noting that "[a] tax
exemption in many cases is economically and functionally
indistinguishable from a direct monetary subsidy. 2 (x, In Regan, the
Court characterized "tax exemptions and tax-deductibility [as] a
form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system,"

202. id. at 698.

203. Id.
204. The direct benefit of increasing certain citizens' taxes to produce the
same total revenue for use by the government would accrue to bondholders,
not to the religious institution. The indirect benefit of a lower interest rate on
its borrowing would accrue to the religious institution.
205. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301 F.3d
401,438 (Clay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003).

206. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 859
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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observing that "[a] tax exemption has much the same effect as a
cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to
pay on its income [and that] [d]eductible contributions are similar
to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual's
contributions. 2 7 The Court noted, however, citing Walz, that tax
exemptions and deductions were not identical to cash subsidies."
Nyquist,2°9 decided on the same day as Hunt, struck down a
statute that provided tax deductions for parents in certain income
ranges-whose children attended elementary or secondary nonpublic
schools. Justice Souter, dissenting in Zelman, asserted that Nyquist
"held that aid to parents through tax deductions was no different
from forbidden direct aid to religious schools for religious uses.'"'0
The majority in Zelman limited Nyquist, however, categorizing the
unconstitutional statute as one that the Court invalidated because
its sole purpose was to provide financial support for nonpublic
sectarian institutions. The Court explained that the rule in Nyquist
"[did] not govern neutral educational assistance programs that, like
the [voucher] program [considered in Zelman] offer[ed] aid directly
to a broad class of individual recipients defined without regard to
religion."2 1 Using the majority's approach, the Supreme Court
could distinguish the Nyquist statute from the typical conduit
statute that. provides aid to a broad range of entities that fulfill the
statute's valid public purpose.
The resolution authorizing a
particular bond issue for a religious institution, however, would be
enacted for the sole purpose of benefiting the religious institution
and could therefore be considered a law "respecting an
establishment of religion" under Nyquist.
Even if the Supreme Court limited Nyquist to its facts, it
would need to examine further the nature of a tax-exempt bond
issue. The exemption of church property and the allowance of
207. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544
(1983).
208. Id. at 544 n.5.
209. Nyquist v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
210. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 693 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).

211. Id. at 661-62.
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deductions for contributions to religious institutions, or for
expenditures at religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools,
are not directly analogous to a tax exemption granted to
bondholders.
One difference is the justification for the tax
exemption.
Nyquist explained that historic practice justified
property tax exemptions for religious institutions. 12 Walz2 " and
Nyquist"4 also explained that property tax exemption avoided the
appearance of compulsory support of the government by religious
institutions through taxation of church property. Another purpose
of the exemption of church property from taxation was the
avoidance of unseemly government involvement in foreclosing on a
church to collect delinquent taxes. In contrast, if the law permitted
governments to issue taxable conduit bonds for religious
institutions, and bondholders neglected to pay taxes on their
interest income, government officials prosecuting tax delinquencies
would interact with the bondholders, not with the religious
institution benefiting from the issuance of the bonds.
Steele's reliance on Mueller in its discussion of the nature of
the aid also weakens the argument that tax exemption falls in a
different category from direct expenditure of government funds. In
Mueller, aid reached the sectarian schools as a result of the choices
of individual parents. No exercise of governmental discretion
comparable to the approval of the bonds in a conduit financing
took place.1 Similarly, individual donors, not a government entity,
choose which religious institutions benefit from tax-deductible
contributions.
In addition, Mueller did not address the
constitutionality of financing religious facilities, since the tax
deduction was not available to parents for the purchase of
specifically religious books. '16 Therefore, a court would be required
to distinguish Mueller by characterizing the aid in a tax-exempt
financing as non-governmental.
Mitchell and Zelman offer some guidance as to the Justices'

212. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 792.

213. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
214. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793.
215. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983).
216. Id. at 391 n.1.
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possible views. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Zelman and
Justice Souter's dissents in Mitchell and Zelman left open the
possibility that they would conclude that, because no taxpayer
funds would be directly expended for religious activities when a
government instrumentality lent bond proceeds to a religious
institution, no Establishment Clause violation would occur. Justice
O'Connor approved school vouchers even though she recognized
that the voucher case was "different from prior indirect aid cases in
part because a significant portion of the funds appropriated for the
voucher program reach[ed] religious schools without restrictions on
the use of these funds. 21 7 In buttressing her argument that a state
school voucher program was not a radical departure from prior
cases upholding government support for religious institutions,
Justice O'Connor cited, as examples of tax policies that "confer a
significant relative benefit on religious institutions," exemptions of
religious organizations from state property taxes, federal corporate
income tax, state corporate income tax in many states, federal tax
deductions for charitable contributions to qualified religious
groups, and federal and state tax credits for educational expenses,
including expenses for attending religious schools. '
In Mitchell, Justice Souter cited Hunt and, in particular, the
description of tax-exempt financing in Footnote 7, as an example of
approved aid that did not violate the constitutional prohibition
against diversion of government funds."' Similarly, in his dissent in
Zelman, Justice Souter, with whom Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined, distinguished between a tuition voucher program,
tax
"[an unconstitutional] scheme that systematically
S . ,,220 provides
and benefits in
money to support the schools' religious missions,
In examining the
the form of tax exemption or deduction.
relevance of Justice O'Connor's emphasis in her concurrence in
Zelman on how substantial the aid might be, Justice Souter
distinguished between direct aid to sectarian schools for religious
217. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
218. Id. at 665 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
219. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 891-92 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
220. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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teaching and the tax exemptions upheld in Walz and Mueller, even
221
though those government benefits were significant. 2
Thus, Justice O'Connor in Zelman and Justice Souter,
dissenting in Mitchell 22 and in Zelman,223 have identified the indirect
aid of a tax exemption as acceptable, suggesting that a tax-exempt
bond issue for the benefit of a religious institution might not violate
the Establishment Clause. Although these arguments lead to the
conclusion that the form of the aid determines constitutionality, the
issue remains whether the government's role in selecting the
religious institutions that benefit from tax-exemption and in
contracting with the religious institution to make a loan of bond
proceeds implicates the Establishment Clause.
-

(c). Excessive EntanglementInvolves the Considerationof the
Resulting RelationshipBetween Government and Religious
Authority
Issuing tax-exempt bonds would not result in the kind of
excessive entanglement between the government and religious
authority that recent cases have discussed. 125 If the Supreme Court

221. Id. at 709 n.19 (Souter, J., dissenting).
222. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice Souter in dissent.
223. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Souter in
dissent.
224. See supra Section III(B)(1)(d).
225. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 745-49 (1973). In Hunt, the Court
approved much more intrusive monitoring against improper use than the
typical loan agreement requires at present. To some degree, the lack of
monitoring by the government instrumentality results from a change since the
decision in Hunt in the way tax-exempt financings are structured. Initially,
many conduit financings were structured as lease transactions with title to the
financed property transferring to the public body and then being leased back
to the benefited institution. Like the financing discussed in Hunt, see supra
note 36, the transactions on the surface appeared to be traditional real estate
leases with the government as lessor and conduit borrower as lessee. These
lease statutes may have reflected the beliefs of state legislators, accustomed to
traditional government bonds, that in order to obtain a federal tax exemption,
the conduit bonds were required to be government bonds and the projects
were required to be owned by the government in order to demonstrate that
they served a public purpose. At present, typical transaction documents no
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accepted the Footnote 7 concept that tax-exempt financing is an
indirect government service, then no monitoring against religious
use would be required. The indirect nature of the subsidy would
eliminate the Court's concern about religious use. The actual use of
proceeds for religious purposes would not be relevant so long as the
government issuer had initially determined that the financing
fulfilled the secular purpose of the statute.
(3). The Statute May Not Have a Primary Effect of Advancing or
Inhibiting Religion by Defining Its Recipients by Reference to
Religion
A neutral bond financing statute would not on its face
define beneficiaries by reference to religion. A government issuer's
bond resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds for the benefit of
a religious institution might be deemed to define the beneficiary of
the borrowing with reference to religion. Local governments could
assert, however, that the bond resolution benefiting the religious
institution was one of a series of resolutions it had adopted to meet
its secular goals.
Addressing the portion of the Lemon-Agostini test that
assesses whether recipients of government benefits are defined by
reference to religion, the court in Johnson, examining a bond
financing statute, focused on whether the criteria for allocating the
aid created a financial incentive to undertake religious
116
The court, quoting Agostini, said that such an
indoctrination.
incentive was "not present ...where the aid [was] allocated on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor[ed] nor

longer require government surveillance to ensure that contractual promises
against religious use are met, although inspections for such purposes are
occasionally specifically authorized. The Court in Hunt was not troubled by
lease provisions that allowed the governmental agency to inspect the project
to ensure that the covenant against religious use was honored or that allowed
the government to take over the project in the event of default. The Court,
therefore, determined that the lease would not result in an unconstitutional
degree of entanglement between the state and the college. Id.
226. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 2001 FED App. 0015P (6th Cir.), 241
F.3d 501,514.
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disfavor[ed] [religious beneficiaries], and [was] made available to
both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory
basis. ' 22' The court identified the bondholders, who were not
defined by reference to religion, as the beneficiaries of government
aid and held that the issuance of tax-exempt bonds "in no way
create[d] a financial incentive for the bondholders who actually
receive[d] the [tax] exemption to favor religious entities over nonreligious entities. ' 228 In MitchellL the Court noted that simply
reducing the cost of securing a religious education did not create an
incentive to attend a religious school. Similarly, state statutes
reducing the cost to a religious institution of borrowing money
would not create a financial incentive to attend a religious
institution or to adopt a particular religious doctrine.
Thus, a statute that allows the issuance of conduit bonds for
the benefit of both religious and nonsectarian institutions and a
local government resolution adopted for the purpose of fulfilling a
secular purpose would not have a primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, even where the particular government action
authorizing the issuance of the bonds for a particular religious
institution could be construed as defining the recipients of its
benefits by reference to religion.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has examined possible responses of the current
Supreme Court Justices to a case that directly addresses whether a
government could issue tax-exempt bonds to finance religious
improvements for a church, synagogue, temple, mosque, or other
pervasively sectarian institution. In the thirty years since the
Supreme Court decided ,,2Hunt, the "wall of separation between
21
Church and State ' 23
" has continued to erode.
The plurality
opinion in Mitchell appears to indicate that Justices Thomas, Scalia,
227. Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997)).
228. Id. at 515.
229. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 814 (2000) (plurality opinion).
230. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)); cf. HAMBURGER, supra note 162, at 1.
231. See Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 221.
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Rehnquist, and Kennedy would adopt the view that indirect aid in
the form of a tax-exempt bond issue is a government service that
should be made neutrally available to any institution that can fulfill
the secular purpose of a bond statute. Justices Breyer, Souter, and
Stevens have asserted that the Establishment Clause prohibits laws
respecting an establishment of religion and does not merely
mandate that all religions have an equal opportunity to benefit
232
Nonetheless, those Justices have
from government assistance.
joined in opinions that distinguish direct aid from the provision of
tax exemption. Similarly, while refusing to embrace the plurality's
neutrally available aid doctrine as the sole determinant of the
constitutionality of a statute under the Establishment Clause,
Justices Souter and O'Connor, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Stevens, have stated that indirect aid in the form of a tax
211
Justice
exemption does not implicate the Establishment Clause.
3
Souter's specific reliance on Footnote 7 in Mitchel 4 in identifying
Hunt as a case that did not involve direct government aid suggests
that he would include tax-exempt bonds in the category of
permissible indirect assistance.
All nine Justices continue, however, to rely upon private
choice to uphold government aid to religiously affiliated schools.
The bond resolution adopted by the government issuer of the
bonds and the applicable elected official's TEFRA approval reflect
public, not private, choices. The argument that the private choices
made by purchasers of the bonds break the connection between the
government and the religious institution cannot be maintained,
since under current federal and state law, it is critical that the link
not be broken between the issuance of tax-exempt bonds and the
advancement of a public purpose. In addition to the obstacles
presented by the requirement of actual governmental approval,
Justices Souter and O'Connor have expressed concerns about the
appearanceof government approval and may find that government
sanction of the bonds outweighs the indirect nature of the aid.

232. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 721-23 (2002) (Breyer, J.,

dissenting).
233. Id. at 665 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 686 (Souter, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
234. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 892 (Souter, J.,
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Thus, the dissenters may conclude that the issuance of tax-exempt
bonds to pay for sectarian facilities for a religious institution
constitutes the "sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity" that the
Establishment Clause prohibits. 2
As tempting as the argument may be that the enormous
economic benefit to a religious institution created by a tax-exempt
financing constitutes impermissible direct government financial
support, that line of reasoning was rejected by the Court in
Everson, which approved substantial indirect financial aid to
sectarian schools by subsidizing transportation costs for parochial
school students. Walz approved the indirect financial aid to
236
religious institutions that a property tax exemption provides.
Subsequent cases approving indirect government support, such as
Agostini and Zelman, have made clear that indirect aid with no
religious content can result in significant monetary aid to sectarian
schools without constituting unconstitutional direct government
financial support.
The indirect nature of the aid in a tax-exempt bond
financing should also lessen concern about the active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity.
Following the LemonAgostini-Steele guidelines, the Court would be justified in
concluding that bond financing statutes do not have a primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion."' Bond financing statutes
do not define recipients of their benefits by reference to religion or
create an incentive to undertake religious indoctrination. 2" No
excessive entanglement would exist, because the nature of the state
aid in the form of provision of tax exemption would make the
character and purposes of the institution benefited irrelevant and
the resulting relationship between government and religious
authority minimal."' The fact that aid would be available to any
institution that could fulfill the secular purpose of the statute would

235. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
236. Id. at 674-75.

237. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
238. See Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 698 (Va. 2000).
239. See id.
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indicate that any indoctrination that occurred 2at the religious
10
institution was not attributable to the government.
Reaching the conclusion that no prohibited form of aid is
diverted to religious use in a conduit financing would not require
repudiation of the pervasively sectarian test with respect to direct
state aid or overruling of those cases that rely upon the secular
nature of facilities being financed. Overruling Hunt would not be
necessary, since Hunt did not reject the argument concerning the
nature of the aid but grounded its holding on the fact that the
college was not pervasively sectarian and that no religious facilities
were financed. Adopting the Court's reasoning in Steele would
provide an alternative explanation for the holding in Hunt and
would extend the reasoning of the Supreme Court set forth in cases
decided since Hunt. Such a result is not unimaginable, given the
Supreme Court's recent Establishment Clause analysis, which,
while couched in the language of neutrality, appears to promote
and favor religious institutions.'
Thus, it would not be
unreasonable for bond counsel to test the limits of the Supreme
Court's neutrally-available-aid interpretation of the Establishment
Clause in order to convince a court to validate the issuance of

240. See id. at 699.
241. Bond counsel should also be aware that state constitutional
provisions may affect the validity of tax-exempt bonds for religious
institutions. In Witters, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the
case to the state court with the statement that "the state court is of course free
to consider the applicability of the 'far stricter' dictates of the Washington
State Constitution." Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489
(1986). The Washington Constitution provides that "no public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment." WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 11; see also Witters, 474 U.S. at 484 (quoting this provision). The state
court in Witters then applied the Washington State Constitution to prohibit
grant of the scholarship. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119
(Wash. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). In Lynn, the Court indicated
that state statutes and the state constitution, not the Establishment Clause,
precluded issuance of tax-exempt bonds for a divinity school. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d
at 699. The Supreme Court has held that giving effect to state constitutional
provisions that prohibit direct state aid to individuals seeking to use state
scholarships to pursue theology degrees does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1315 (2004).
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bonds to finance religious projects for a sectarian institution.
The issue remains, however, whether the adoption of a
bond resolution by the issuer and the applicable elected official
approval would constitute government sponsorship of a religious
institution. The issuance of tax-exempt bonds might not constitute
direct financial support to a religious institution or actively involve
the sovereign in religious activities, but the name of the bonds and
the statutory requirement for government issuance of the bonds
would connote government endorsement. Federal law requiring
that government instrumentalities issue tax-exempt bonds suggests
that the indoctrination that occurs at religious institutions
supported by tax-exempt bonds would be attributable to the
242
government.
By structuring state and federal statutes to involve
the government, Congress and state legislatures have determined
that the government has a role in deciding which public purposes to
support. The need for that government decision precludes a simple
conclusion that private individual choices would confer the benefit
of tax exemption upon religious institutions.
Even if government sponsorship were not an issue, religious
institutions might find that government officials were cautious
about participating in these financings. Removing the wall between
government instrumentalities and religious institutions would result
in government officials having to make uncomfortable decisions
favoring and disfavoring religious institutions, fostering strife and
divisiveness. That discomfort would be the effect of the active role
that the government takes in a conduit financing in selecting which
institutions benefit from the government's agreement to participate
in a bond issue.243

242. State statutes that authorize governments to create nonprofit
corporations or governmental authorities to issue conduit bonds do not solve
the appearance of government support since the nonprofit corporations and
authorities are government instrumentalities and, in any case, a public official
or voters in the project's jurisdiction must also approve the bonds. See supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
243. The selection process highlights one difficulty of the equal
opportunity or neutrality view of the Establishment Clause. The neutrality
view presumes a benevolent tolerance by all religious groups towards their
competitors and by government officials towards all religious groups. Such
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Courts should also be sensitive to the implications of the
Supreme Court's viewpoint discrimination cases in the context of
tax-exempt financing. In a series of cases characterizing the
government as the facilitator of private speech, the Court has
invalidated statutes and administrative policies that prohibit
religiously affiliated groups from using public forums or obtaining
expression
when the government
government funding for religious
S
1t
44
Although the Supreme Court
program supports secular speech.

tolerance is not universal. Labeling attempts to distance government from
religion as "bigotry" disregards the experience of dissenters and those of
minority religious faiths. The neutrality view embraces only the Free Exercise
Clause and discounts the words of the Establishment Clause.
244. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
508 U.S. 384 (1993), for example, the Court held that denying the use of
school facilities to a religious group when the school board had opened school
facilities for use after school hours by community groups for social, civic, and
recreational purposes and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the
community, but not for religious purposes, constituted viewpoint
discrimination, since it allowed school property to be used for the presentation
of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the
subject matter from a religious standpoint. Id. at 393-94. In Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the Court held
that a state university's program that authorized payments from a fund
composed of mandatory student fees to outside contractors for printing costs
of publications of extracurricular student groups related to the educational
purpose of the university, other than newspapers that "primarily promote[d]
or manifestled ] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality,"
invalidly discriminated against religious groups on the basis of viewpoint. Id.
at 823. The Court said that the fund was "a forum more in a metaphysical
than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles [enunciated in
It characterized the
Lamb's Chapel] [were] applicable." Id. at 830.
newspaper's speech as "private speech endorsing religion, which the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect," rather than "government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids." Id. at 841. Good
News Club extended the ruling to include use of public school facilities, where
the Court said that a school district had created a limited public forum for
events "pertaining to the welfare of the community." Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 108 (2001). The Court emphasized that
"speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a
limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a
religious viewpoint." Id. at 112; accord Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159
F.3d 151,156 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1013 (1999).
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in Locke v. Davey... has recently curtailed the reach of the
viewpoint discrimination cases, it is not unlikely that, if the
Supreme Court were to approve of tax-exempt financing for
religious institutions using the Footnote 7 analysis, a religious
2 46
institution will probe the limits of the "play in the joints
described in Davey and bring suit against a government authority to
force the issuance of bonds for its benefit. The religious institution
would argue that a structure created by statute that allows taxexempt financing is analogous to a limited public forum "in a
metaphysical ... sense. 247
It would contend that, under the
authority of a statute authorizing financing for a secular public
purpose, the government could not silence the expression of
selected viewpoints by refusing such assistance to a religious
institution whose project fulfilled the statute's secular public
248
purpose. Under this analysis, state and local government issuers
would risk liability149 if they rejected an application for assistance
from one religious institution, even for valid, non-discriminatory
reasons, while approving an application from another.5
245. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). The Davey Court rested the decision on "the
play in the joints" between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 1311. The Court rejected the argument that a state's refusal to
grant a scholarship to a student seeking a degree in theology under a program
providing assistance to all students who met certain financial and scholastic
criteria violated the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 1315.
246. Id. at 1311.
247. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
248. But see Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1313 n.3 (rejecting the viewpoint
discrimination argument). The Davey Court refused to extend public forum
cases to state scholarship programs, holding that the purpose of the
scholarship program was "not to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers." Id. (quoting United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 206
(2003) (plurality opinion)).
249. Liability to suit and to damages would depend upon each state's
sovereign immunity law.
250. This argument succeeded in Industrial Development Authority v.
Mohler, 51 Va. Cir. 449 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), in which the court held that
denying a religious primary and secondary school the benefit of tax-exempt
bonds under a neutral program, based on the school's alleged pervasively
religious viewpoint, would infringe the school's free speech rights under the
First Amendment. The court, citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837, determined
that the school seeking tax-exempt financing was not pervasively sectarian,
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Interpreting the Establishment Clause to allow issuance of taxexempt bonds for religious institutions could force governmental
authorities to be equal opportunity lenders, negating Congress's
intention of allowing local governments to choose which projects to
assist. Congress's objective of giving local governments control
over the selection of projects benefiting from tax-exempt financing
would be frustrated if the courts held that a government
instrumentality was subject to the constraints imposed upon a
251
government acting as the facilitator of private speech.
and thus the free speech infringement was not excused by the necessity of
complying with the Establishment Clause. The court made clear that under
current Supreme Court jurisprudence it was required to rely on the nonpervasively sectarian nature of the school to validate the bonds, but it
appeared to believe that even a pervasively sectarian school could benefit
from tax-exempt financing and that denying tax-exempt financing to a
pervasively sectarian university would violate the Free Speech Clause. See
Mohler, 51 Va. Cir. passim.
251. In contrast, a government issuer could assert that its responsibility
to determine whether a bond issue had a proper public purpose and the
required applicable elected official approval would place the government in
the category of "government as speaker" in cases relating to the government's
expenditure of funds to promote its own message rather than facilitating or
encouraging a diversity of views from private speakers. See Rosenberger,515
U.S. at 832-34. Cases characterizing the government as speaker have
"reject[ed] the 'notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully
realized unless they are subsidized by the State.' " Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (quoting Cammavan v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)); see also
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585-86 (1998) (holding
that the NEA can exercise discretion over arts funding decisions without
violating the First Amendment); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-94 (1991)
(holding that the government can decline to subsidize programs generally
without violating viewpoint discrimination doctrine). Under Regan, Finley,
and Rust, an issuer's ability to issue bonds for a given public purpose would
not generate rights for religious institutions under the Free Speech Clause or
the Free Exercise Clause, since the purpose of the bond financing statute
would not be to encourage private speech but rather to promote a
government-determined public purpose. The government issuer could select
and reject projects of religious institutions without violating the Free Speech
Clause or the Free Exercise Clause since the government would not be
required to subsidize a religious institution's exercise of its constitutional
rights. Instead, the government would argue that it could make distinctions
among beneficiaries in order to further proper public purposes that it wished
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Thus, the Justices of the Supreme Court must evaluate the
appearance of government sponsorship that a conduit bond issue
for a religious institution conveys. Even if the Court determines
that the role of the government is insignificant in a conduit
financing, the Court should recognize the importance of symbolism
and the danger of the appearance of government endorsement of
religion. The Court should mandate disclosure of the limited role
of government at all points of the proceedings. Because of
Establishment Clause concerns, plain English statements should be
added to official statements, public notices, and financing
documents stating that the issuance of bonds by the government
instrumentality is not intended as and does not constitute an
endorsement of the religious principles of the benefited religious
institution or a repudiation of the religious tenets of any other
religious institution. 2 Disclosure documents should make clear
that the government's purpose is to provide tax-exempt status on
bonds to further a valid public purpose, such as economic
development, health care, or education, and not to provide direct
government monetary assistance to the religious institution to
further its religious objectives."3 Loan agreements between the
government issuer and the religious institution should explicitly
to promote.

Characterizing the government as speaker would require

resolution of the issues raised with respect to government selection of
beneficiaries discussed supra in Section III(B)(1)(d)(i).
252. The district court in Steele objected to the official statement for the
bond issue, because it appeared to link the tenets of the religious school with
the government instrumentality issuing the bonds. The court explained that,
unlike the university in Rosenberger, a reasonable observer could assume that
the governmental issuer in Steele was endorsing the religious views of the
pervasively sectarian university. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 693,
734 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)), rev'd, 2002 FED App. 0274P (6th Cir.), 301
F.3d 401, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003).
253. In Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), Justices
Marshall and Brennan concurred in the judgment of the Court that a high
school could not exclude a religious club from benefits the school provided to
nonreligious extracurricular activities. They further asserted that "[the high
school] must fully disassociate itself from the club's religious speech and avoid
appearing to sponsor or endorse the club's goals.- Id. at 270 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
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prohibit the religious institution from advertising or suggesting in
any way that the issuance of tax-exempt bonds and approval of the
issuance by an elected official constitutes sponsorship of the
religious institution's religious tenets.
Thus, while current Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests
that the members of the Court may validate tax-exempt bonds for
religious institutions, governments and religious institutions must
make clear to the reasonable observer that the government is not
sponsoring the religious institution, providing direct financial
254
religious activity.
support, or in any way actively involving itself in
A government issuer must impose safeguards to prevent the fact
and the appearance of active government support and sponsorship
of a religious institution so that the issuance of tax-exempt bonds to
finance projects for religious institutions will not violate the
Establishment Clause.

254. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).

